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Personal agenda in Musharraf’s imposition of emergency |
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Harjit Singh
Whatever justification Gen. Musharraf may give to defend his imposition of emergency saying that the judiciary was working at cross-purposes with the executive, there are no takers for his explanations. It does not require much political acumen to conclude that the real intention of the emergency was to muzzle the Supreme Court which, it was apprehended, would pronounce an adverse verdict on Musharraf’s election as President.
The circumstances under which he suddenly imposed the emergency – when he was about to lose his job as the Army chief and even the Presidency, if the petitions against his eligibility in the Supreme Court were upheld, lead to this conclusion. That the chief anxiety of Musharraf in imposing the emergency was to remove Supreme Court Chief Justice Chaudhury and replace him with a pliant successor became clear when he dismissed him and appointed in his place Abdul Hameed Dogar, one of whose first jobs was to dismiss the petition challenging Musharraf’s election. This despite the embarrassment of Musharraf when seven of the 12 Supreme Court Judges refused to take oath under the Provisional Constitutional Order.
Musharraf was finding himself cornered on all sides. Pressure from the US had forced him to negotiate a power-sharing deal with Benazir Bhutto and allow her return to the country to lead her party in elections. But, this had created heartburn in the party he himself had promoted, PML [Q] after splitting Nawaz Sharif’s PML. PML[Q] leaders including its chief, Choudhury Shujaat Hussain, were unhappy with any power sharing deal with Benazir Bhutto and after the General’s re-election with the tacit support of the PPP, which did not join the Opposition in resigning en masse from the Assemblies ahead of the Presidential election, he demanded, the deal should not be gone through now that the purpose of seeking her party’s cooperation had been served. PML[Q] leaders are afraid that the elections will see the PPP emerge victorious and the King’s party will lose power.
Gen. Musharraf gave little attention to these complaints and was more concerned about losing his own power. He had fought the Presidential election with his uniform on and this was challenged by the two defeated candidates in the Supreme Court which was headed by his sworn enemy, Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry whom he had unsuccessfully tried to oust. Given the merits of the case, it was a foregone conclusion that the Supreme Court will give a ruling against Musharraf’s election. Already forced to give a commitment on giving up the Army post after the November 15 swearing in for a second term as President, Musharraf was in a quandary over what to do. The return of Benazir Bhutto and the Supreme Court nod for Nawaz Sharif’s return had left very little space for Musharraf to manoevre.
Gen. Musharraf’s popularity rating as a strong Army leader had already gone down several notches after a defiant pro-Taliban Mullah, Maulana Fazlullah captured several areas in the strategic Swat Valley and took hundreds of Pakistani troops hostage. The despatch of an extra 2500 troops had made little impact on the capacity of the Mullah. Nearer the capital, two suicide bomb attacks, one close to the Army House in Rawalpindi and another on an Army bus near an Air Force base in Sargodha took a further toll of his credentials as a strong administrator and Army chief. Ever since the assault on the Lal Masjid, the jihadis have been baying for his blood. So much so that there were reports that Washington was preparing a retirement home for Musharraf to live in exile in the US while the two exiled Prime Ministers returned home. The presence of the US Central Command chief in Islamabad and his meeting with Gen. Musharraf just a day before the declaration of emergency shows that the US was aware of his plan and the Admiral was sent in a last ditch effort to dissuade him from going ahead with his plan.
Although India has taken a neutral, cautious and middle of the road stand, merely expressing its regret rather than condemning the emergency and calling for its revocation, unlike the US, there are differing opinions about its impact. One view is that pre-occupied as he is with his problems at home, Musharraf and the Army and the ISI will be more busy with setting their own house in order than on executing their plans to help terrorist outfits carry out attacks in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere. Another view, however, is that with more and more Pakistani military units occupied with maintaining internal order and the diversion of many Brigades to take on the pro-Taliban elements in Waziristan and Swat Valley, a comparatively less secured border would be a boon for militants to infiltrate into J&K. The Indian Government has taken precautions after reports of relocation of Pakistani troops from the border with India to Pakistan’s North-Western border areas. But, whether the infiltration goes up or not, there are no two opinions that the Indo-Pakistan composite dialogue including talks on Kashmir and joint anti-terrorism mechanism will definitely take a backseat.
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