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Pakistan : Role of military in the country’s governance

	July 09, 2001

Reconstitution of NSC



In what is seen as the first major step towards the institutionalisation of the role of the Army in the country’s governance, the Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has reconstituted the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is the supreme body vested with powers to aid and advise the President on all vital national matters. The President, rather than the Chief Executive, will head the revamped organisation. Under an order passed by Gen. Musharraf, the reconstituted NSC will be dominated by the military and all other members in the Council will be the appointees of the President. The job of the Council is to aid and advise the president on matters relating to the Islamic ideology, security, integrity and solidarity of Pakistan. In other words, it covers the whole gamut of issues under the subject of governance.

The President will be the Chairman of the Council. It will comprise the Chief Executive (Gen. Musharraf), the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (Gen. Musharraf), the three Services Chiefs, provincial Governors and “such other members” as may be appointed by the President in his discretion. The Council members will hold office during the “pleasure of the President” and its meeting will be called at any place deemed fit by the President. As per the new order, the decision of the President, after taking into consideration the deliberations of the Council “shall be enforced and given effect in a manner as deemed fit by the President”. The non-military members of the Council will have to take an oath before the President in the form set out in the schedule of the new order. In other words, the President shall be the supreme authority of the Council and the tilt of the reconstituted body is heavily in favour of the military. The Council is a creation of the Musharraf Government. Gen. (Retd) Jahangir Karamat, the predecessor of Gen. Musharraf, had quit his job following differences with the then Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif, over the question of constituting the Council.

The NSC, constituted by Gen. Musharraf within weeks after the 1999 coup had several civilian members. But with the latest reconstitution, the Council will be totally under the control of the military. Gen. Musharraf, ever since he assumed the reins of the country, has been hinting at the need for institutionalising of the Army’s role in the country’s governance. His case is that there was need for checked and balances on the unbridled powers of the office of the Prime Minister, given the bitter experience of the past. The political parties are bound to resent the reconstitution of the NSC in such a way that the Army retains control over the body and in the process, on all crucial matters of governance.

Side by side with the formation of the National Security Council, Gen. Musharraf is continuing with the experiment of his own version of democracy. As part of the ploy for power-sharing at the grassroots level, district level voting was held in the restive port city of Karachi on July 2, which however left five people dead. Two men died when a bomb exploded in a cinema house in Karachi. Political parties were barred from putting up candidates for these elections and security was tightened in view of the strong opposition by them.



Economic collapse

Gen. Musharraf captured power on the plea that the last two corrupt civilian governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had brought the country to the brink of an economic collapse. The General has, however, failed to turn the economy back to its track. Analysts in Pakistan have painted a picture of a nation on the verge of sliding into an economic quagmire. An IMF mission in Islamabad has reviewed the third quarter’s economic performance and opened preliminary talks for the so-called Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). With the latest stand-by arrangement, Pakistan, however, bargained its economy’s long-term strength, for a short-term $ 596 million breather. Conspiracy theories aside, the insistence of the IMF to impose general sales tax on agriculture inputs (and the acceptance by Pakistan’s economic managers) raises doubts about the sincerity and seriousness of the IMF’s commitment to reduce poverty.

Domestic investment has nosedived to 1.8 per cent as against 8 per cent last year, a key Cabinet member said. The GDP growth will be 2.6 per cent as against the annual target of 4.5 per cent. Stressing that by 2025, India will be to South Asia what the USA is to North America and the low and middle road scenarios will place Pakistan in reference to India in the same position that Mexico currently has to the USA, observer Shahid Javed Burki in an article published in Dawn.



Military takeovers

Ever since the evolution of the floundering nation-state, Pakistan’s Army has projected itself as “the guardian of the nation’s values and ideas and the protector of Islam” and has always looked upon itself as the protector of the nation’s physical boundaries as well as its ideological frontiers. Giving a background of how from time to time civilian Governments were toppled in Pakistan, Gurmeet Kanwal, a research scholar at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, recalls that the militarization of the Pakistani polity began soon after Independence. General (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan was for some time the Commander-in-Chief (1951-58) as well as the Minister of Defence (1954-58) before he finally overthrew the Government and established Pakistan’s first military regime in 1958. Instead of concentrating his energies on improving the organisation structure, the standard of training and the level of preparedness of his Army, Ayub Khan “chose to dabble in politics” and gradually began to “enjoy wielding extra-constitutional authority”. Ayub Khan experimented with a system of “Basic Democracy” for Pakistan in which the people were allowed only a limited amount of participation.

General Yahya Khan (1966-71) was sworn in as interim President in 1969 when Ayub Khan was finally forced to step down after a popular people’s movement. Yahya Khan retained the post of COAS. His fall from grace and power in the wake of Pakistan’s humiliating military defeat at India’s hands and the birth of Bangladesh in 1971, led to the appointment of General Gul Hasan as the COAS (1971-72) by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had taken over as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator. Gul Hassan was, in turn, replaced within three months by General Tikka Khan (1972-76), better known as the butcher of Bangladesh. Bhutto “tried to rein in the unbridled power” enjoyed by the military. In May 1976, he issued a White Paper outlining the Government’s defence and strategic policy and institutional arrangements for a Higher Defence Organisation. However, his efforts failed to work and Bhutto was overthrown in a military coup.

On Gen. Tikka Khan’s retirement, Bhutto, by then Prime Minister, had “handpicked” General Zia-ul-Haq as the new COAS (1976-88); (till his death in an air crash) over the heads of several senior Generals and hoped that his “protege would toe” the line of his civilian bosses. However, Zia had other ideas and not only overthrew Bhutto on 5 July 1977 and once again proclaimed marital law but also hanged him on trumped up charges. Zia ruled for eight years as the absolute ruler under martial law and for three years as a civilian President with absolute powers. Zia got the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate embroiled in the Afghan war and commenced the Islamisation of the Army. During 1983-85, after Bhutto’s execution, Zia began to legitimize his military rule. He even tried limited local government in the four provinces without much success. Zia played the role of a consummate politician to the hilt despite having had an army upbringing. Zia aided the growth of the Mohajir Quami Movement to check the spread of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Karachi.

It was only in 1985, that General Zia yielded to a civilian regime but not before promulgating the dreaded Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, under the cloak of which elected civilian administrations could be and were repeatedly dismissed by Pakistan’s Presidents in collusion with the Army brass. Gen. Zia continued to retain the two important posts of President and COAS and introduced a structure in which politicians were prepared to accept a political role for the military. However, he soon realized that a parliamentary form of government could “not co-exist happily” with a strong President and dismissed Prime Minister Junejo in May 1988. On the demise of Gen. Zia, General Aslam Beg (1988-91) stepped into the power vacuum as COAS and Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a Pakistan Civil Service bureaucrat, was sworn in as Acting President. Despite “doomsday predictions” by well-known defence analysts in India and other parts of the world, this time the Pakistan Army took care to act in a mature manner. Under Aslam Beg’s leadership, the Pakistan Army headquarters carefully weighed the pros and cons of continuing with martial law regime and magnanimously decided that a return to Army-backed democracy would be more appropriate. It was at this stage (early 1989) that the concept of the ruling “troika” emerged. It was an informal grouping that comprised the President, the Prime Minister and the COAS and ruled Pakistan through consensus. However, the Army made it quite clear that it was the source of real power and preferred to let civilians bear the burden of governance.

The ruling elite “grudgingly” accepted Benazir Bhutto as Prime Minister in 1988 under American pressure but only when she agreed to their terms. It was agreed that Benazir Bhutto’s party would support the election of Ghulam Ishaq Khan as President of Pakistan for a full term and not interfere with the military’s management of the Government’s Afghan policy. She would also not intervene in the military’s internal administration (postings, transfers and promotions). Bhutto also “agreed to be guided” by Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Aslam Beg in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile capability.

Aslam Beg was followed by General Asif Nawaz Janjua (1991-93). He was a “no-nonsense” soldier and found it difficult to get along with Nawaz Sharif, whom he considered a scheming politician. He died of a heart attack under mysterious circumstances and was succeeded by General Abdul Waheed Kakar (1993-96). Gen. Abdul Waheed did his best to wean the Army away from politics. Gen. Jehangir Karamat followed as COAS (1996-98) and continued the policies of his predecessor. Acting on inputs provided by the ISI, during the period 1990-96, several civilian governments were dismissed by incumbent Presidents “in connivance” with the COAS. Benazir Bhutto’s government was dismissed by the President in consultation with the COAS in mid-1990 for “persistent and scandalous horse-trading for political gain, breakdown of law and order in Sindh, corruption and nepotism and use of statutory corporations, authorities and banks for political ends and personal gain”. After general elections in October 1990, the Nawaz Sharif-led Islami Jamoori Itehaad coalition, believed to have been cobbled together and funded by the ISI to prevent Benazir from returning to power, won and Sharif became Pakistan’s Prime Minister.

Nawaz Sharif was young and inexperienced and failed to show any commitment to resolve Pakistan’s numerous problems. In April 1993, the President dismissed Nawaz Sharif and installed Balakh Sher Mazari as head of an interim government. However, the Supreme Court ordered the reinstatement of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister and an ugly situation was developing when General Waheed played a positive role. “By combination of tact, forcefulness, honour and tenacity, he convinced the President and the Prime Minister that they should stand down” and they did. Moeen Qureshi, a World Bank economist, agreed to lead a caretaker administration.

In Army-supervised elections, Benazir Bhutto managed to put together a working coalition and once again took over as Prime Minister in October 1993. This time she lasted for three years and, after a lacklustre performance, was finally dismissed again in November 1996 by President Farooq Leghari. In elections held in February 1997, Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League was voted to power. The new Prime Minister was determined to show the nation who was the real boss.

Among the first few major initiatives of the Nawaz Sharif Government was the 13th Amendment to the Pakistan Constitution that curtailed the President’s power to dismiss an elected government. The Government then politicised the issue to appoint five new Supreme Court judges and sought to exploit the deep divisions within the judiciary. During October-November 1997, there was a standoff between the executive and the judiciary, with President Leghari openly siding with the judiciary and criticising Nawaz Sharif’s “personal dictatorship”.

President Farooq Leghari was forced to resign on 2 December 1997 following irreconcilable differences with the Prime Minister. However, Nawaz Sharif’s “high-handed rule” continued. The Army, bureaucracy and the intelligentsia watched from the sidelines as Nawaz Sharif continued to push through controversial legislation despite widespread objections. Sharif had accumulated so much power that his critics began to call him an “elected dictator”. Nawaz Sharif attempted to keep the military at bay by leaning on it for administration. The armed forces were asked to “assist in collecting unpaid electricity bills, building roads and fighting crime to hold the divided country together”.

The COAS, General Jehangir Karamat, was well aware of the falling professional standards and low morale in the Pakistan Army and as a professional himself, he wished to set things right. During a lecture at the Naval War College he advocated the setting up of a National Security Council. PML ideologues interpreted his recommendation as a veiled attempt to institutionalise the role of the Pakistan Army in governance and encouraged the media to make an emotive issue of it. Gen. Karamat’s resignation sent shock waves through the Army as the Pakistani media suggested that the COAS had been asked to resign by the Prime Minister and had complied.

The Prime Minister appointed Gen. Pervez Musharraf (a Mohajir) to the post of COAS and till the Kargil conflict, Nawaz Sharif and Musharraf got along quite well. Musharraf was instrumental in establishing Special Military Courts in Karachi to try MQM workers. Also, it was during his tenure that the Pakistan Army took over the Water and Power Development Authority. Nawaz Sharif, as was his wont, “excelled in running with the hare and hunting with the hounds”. Even as he “kowtowed” to the Muslim clergy for political gains and to the Pakistan Army by approving the Kargil excursion, he made overtures to India and invited Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Lahore in February 1999. Musharraf and the other two Services Chiefs snubbed their own Prime Minister by staying deliberately away from Lahore on a flimsy excuse. With hindsight it can be clearly stated that the Lahore bus diplomacy was deeply resented by the Pakistan Army and the Islamic fundamentalists, as moves for peace with India did not suit the vested interests of either of them. In any case, the Pakistan Army had by then gone too far with its planning for Operation “Badr” in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir and was not going to allow Sharif to ruin what the Pakistan GHQ thought was a bold plan to once again seize the military and moral high ground on Kashmir.

The Musharraf regime’s sole contribution so far appears to have been to institutionalise the role of the Army in governance. Pakistan’s economy is surviving on external life support systems. The lot of its people has “never been worse” than what it is today. Bruised and battered into submission through a half-century of either direct military rule or the military’s watchful oversight over national affairs through a proxy civilian government, the people of Pakistan appear to have “resigned themselves to their fate”.