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North-East : Prospects of Naga peace talks

	June 11, 2001

The news media has portrayed a dismal picture of the state of talks and the ceasefire between the Government of India and the major Naga faction, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (I-M). In truth, the two sides are separated by barely a few words on the extension of their four-year-old ceasefire. Some problems developed during the visit of the government representative, K. Padmanabhiah, to the talks with the Nagas in Bangkok in May. The discussions were, at times, brutally frank and the NSCN leadership even threatened to pull out of the talks if the government did not accept its views on the extension of the area under ceasefire in the Northeast.

A Naga participant who confirmed the differences said he was surprised by Indian news accounts of the talks for the two sides were barely ‘’a line or two’’ from agreement. So where are these major differences that some newspapers have headlined as pushing the talks onto ‘’its last legs?’’

The Naga leadership is based in Bangkok and this is the second round of talks in recent months between Padmanabhiah, the designated representative of the prime minister, and the NSCN (I-M)’s main negotiators: Thiungelang Muivah and Isaak Chisi Swu, respectively general secretary and chairman of the most powerful rebel military machine in the Northeast.

The remarks by the Naga official, who is close to Swu and Muivah, have been confirmed by Padmanabhiah, a former Union Home secretary who has been special envoy to the talks since July 1999. The two days of consultations with Muivah and other NSCN leaders focussed on the announcement of the extension of the ceasefire to a larger geographical area than its current limits to the state of Nagaland. This would mean, in real terms, that the two sides would observe the truce in parts of the hills of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh where the NSCN has bases and cadres and where there have been clashes between the Nagas and security forces. The Naga side has affirmed that the ceasefire area extension and their demand for a larger state comprising ‘’Naga-inhabited areas’’ were two separate issues and would be negotiated separately.

The Nagas say that it is illogical for the government and the NSCN to have a truce in Nagaland and be prepared to fight each other in other parts of the region. Of course, one of the principal demands of the NSCN has been that the negotiations and ceasefire be between ‘two entities’, meaning that the issue is not limited by geographical lines.

Although there was initial opposition from the other state governments on the ceasefire area extension, they had virtually come around to accepting the extension as a positive move that would reduce tension and conflict in their areas. However, there have been changes in the regional political scene in this past month with a new Congress government in Assam and President’s Rule in Manipur. It is unclear how the new government in Assam would react. But despite misgivings, it would make a great deal of sense if all sides agreed to the ceasefire extension to the region in addition to the state of Nagaland. This would be a positive step to a substantive peace.

The talks between Padmanabhiah and Muivah in Bangkok were inconclusive and Muivah, at one point, threatened to break off the discussions and authorised his followers to be prepared to return to the jungle. He also dissolved the Tata Hoho, the ‘Parliament’ of the underground organisation. But this should be seen in the light of asserting his political pre-eminence in the group and giving him a free hand with the negotiations.

The sticking points arose over two phrases in the Indian draft which said that the ceasefire would ‘’operate throughout the North East’’ and spoke of the ‘claim’ to a so-called Greater Nagaland.

The Naga draft reads: ‘’The extent of the ceasefire has no bearing on the issue of the Naga territories. These two are separate issues.’’ Barring this and the dropping of the ‘Northeast’ phrase and no reference to extension of ceasefire for a year beyond August 2001, when it is due to expire, this draft is identical to the government version. Both talk of the ceasefire agreement as between ‘two entities’, that the two sides would abide by revised ceasefire ground rules established in January this year when an elaborate system of checks and balances on both sides was worked out; and to chew the peace pipe further ‘’on substantive issues to bring about a lasting political solution.’’

The government says that while the ceasefire between the two entities is not restricted by physical borders, the reality is that the two sides confront each other only in the Northeast.

Peace returned to Nagaland in 1997 after many years of turmoil when the two sides signed a ceasefire accord and agreed to work for a long-term solution of the Naga issue; the militants have been demanding independence from India. Despite occasional problems, the truce has held although the NSCN (I-M) has made it clear from the initial stage that it wanted the ceasefire to be applicable to all ‘Naga-inhabited areas’ and rejected its limitation to Nagaland. A tougher stance by the group came, predictably, a few days after the Government of India signed a ceasefire accord with a rival NSCN wing on April 28, a move seen by the I-M faction as trying to marginalise it. The action infuriated the Muivah camp. Yet, the Nagas are aware that the stakes are too high to force an abrogation of the ceasefire: civil society in Nagaland and other parts of the Northeast want peace to continue.

The Naga people have been able to breathe - albeit to a limited degree -freely since the ceasefire began. Confrontations between the army and Naga armed groups have sharply fallen. The current ceasefire, restricted to Nagaland, expires on July 31 and both sides have benefited from the peace process. Little or no fighting has been reported in Nagaland; a number of NSCN cadres have settled down to a peaceful life, buying houses and real estate. The extortion of funds by some cadres has also increased. The latter problem has caused the NSCN leadership much concern.

Four years is long enough to tighten the nuts and bolts of the ceasefire. Both sides should now resolve to tackle substantial political issues such as the future of the Nagas and other key elements of a long-term settlement. For that to happen, the Indian political leadership will need to be involved because the impact will be felt far beyond the Northeast. Meanwhile, the Indian media would do well to dig below the surface before jumping to sweeping and erroneous conclusions.



Green signal to NE states to raise forces

The Government of India has given green signal to North Eastern states for raising more India Reserve Battalions to combat insurgency in the region. The government wants the seven north-eastern states to raise in total 16 IR battalions at their earlier.

According to reports, the Assam Government which is often facing terrorist threats from ULFA and Bodo militants, is raising four IR battalions, Tripura and Manipur, three each, Arunachal and Mizoram, two each, while Meghalaya and Nagaland will be raising one each. Though it was proposed that Centre would bear the whole expenditure, it has declared that 50 per cent of the total expenditure will be given to the states as central assistance while the rest will be treated as long term, interest-free loan.

The plight of state police forces in backward states of North East is miserable. In most of the states, the police is lacking the professional qualities and proper training. The arms they possess are obsolete when most of the armed groups of insurgents in the region are operating with highly sophisticated weapons. In view of this situation, the Centre has provided a total fund of Rs. 490.23 crore for modernization of the state police forces in this strife-torn region.