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Monk march in Myanmar : India’s muted reaction |
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Harjit Singh
While the use of force against thousands of Buddhist monks holding peaceful protests in Yangon and other cities of Myanmar for over a week now invited strong condemnation from across the world and the United States went in for fresh sanctions, India’s reaction to the events was very cautious and muted. After several days of protests which were sparked by a hike in fuel prices before they took political overtones, New Delhi finally broke its silence on Sept. 26 when a brief and pithy External Affairs Ministry statement merely expressed the hope that “all sides will resolve their issues peacefully and through dialogue.”
New Delhi also took little note of a joint US-EU statement urging India [and China] to use their closeness and leverage with the Myanmar military junta to refrain from violence and use of force to suppress the peaceful demonstrations. That India would not like to offend Myanmar became clear from the fact that instead of cancelling it, it went ahead with the visit of Petroleum Minister Murli Deora to Myanmar to preside over the signing of an agreement by ONGC Videsh to explore three off-shore blocks for gas, though the visit was kept in a low key.
The question is why India, as the biggest democracy in the world, is “appeasing” the military junta of Myanmar. The answer lies in its strategic position and the Chinese factor in its relations with that country. Myanmar shares a long land and maritime boundary with India. India is engaged with the military junta to use the land routes passing through Myanmar for foreign trade purposes which will help India’s north-eastern States to improve their economic conditions. Myanmar has stopped giving sanctuaries to north-east separatist insurgent groups and destroyed their hideouts in its territory. India has also been awarded oil and gas exploration projects in Myanmar. India’s North-East, sandwiched between Bangladesh, China and Myanmar, can really develop only if it is allowed to open for trade. The North-East’s links with Myanmar will open up the rest of South East Asia too for the region.
But, more than anything else, it is China’s growing influence and leverage through its economic and military assistance that India is keen to neutralize by keeping in close contact with the military regime there.
Myanmar is thankful to China for refusing to cooperate with the rest of the world in imposing punitive sanctions on the military regime and always standing by its side as and when the US and other Western powers in the UN Security Council seek to pass resolutions condemning the military junta or imposing fresh sanctions. In January 2007, Russia and China vetoed a US-sponsored resolution seeking to end repression and release political prisoners in Myanmar. And yielding to Beijing’s pressures following its veto, the military regime awarded gas produced in three Myanmar offshore fields in which India’ ONGC and GAIL have 30 per cent stake, to China.
China has also utilized its political leverage to get closer to the land border with India through military cooperation. China has established military facilities east of the Irrawady river, and major port facilities on India’s eastern doorstep. By substantially establishing its strategic preponderance in the Bay of Bengal including a communication base in Myanmar’s Coco Islands, China is steadily extending its control over the northern parts of Myanmar and could over a time outflank India in Arunachal Pradesh.
China thus has the potential of upsetting India’s security calculations in the North-East besides delaying attempts to find a firmer foothold in the carbon sector.
For about two decades India struggled to define an appropriate response to the suppression of democracy in Myanmar. At a time when championing democracy in Burma (now Myanmar) was not fashionable, the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi supported to the hilt the movement for democracy spearheaded by the now jailed National League for Democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi in the late 1980s. But, in the absence of the West or the East willing to rally behind New Delhi, India was forced to reassess and redefine its approach to Rangoon in the early 1990s. A more realistic policy of “engagement without endorsement” emerged. India’s pragmatism rested on three considerations – the need for the Burmese Army’s cooperation in dealing with the insurgencies in the Northeast, Burma’s natural role as a land-bridge to Southeast Asia, and the importance of preventing Burma’s total dependence on China for external support. India’s realpolitik in Myanmar is now under stress as an alliance of Buddhist monks and pro-democracy activists mounts a challenge against Army rule.
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