India News Online » News Analysis » Indian Politics » 

Kashmir : PM acknowledges change in policy

	June 04, 2001

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee on May 31 acknowledged that the Government had changed its tack on dialogue with Pakistan while taking his cabinet colleagues into confidence on the proposed talks with General Pervez Musharraf. He indicated that the meeting with the General would take place in the first half of July.



Mr. Vajpayee said he took the decision after considering world opinion and the interest of the nation. “I agree that it is a change of tack and we have reversed our position that New Delhi will not talk to Islamabad until it stops supporting cross-border terrorism. But we cannot ignore the overwhelming sentiment in Jammu and Kashmir for peace and international opinion for starting the dialogue”, Mr. Vajpayee is believed to have told his Ministers. Although a section of the Opposition feels that this initiative would only help in giving legitimacy to the Pakistan military ruler, the Prime Minister seemed to be of the view that New Delhi had to ensure a forward movement. Samajwadi Party president Mulayam Singh Yadav has said that the Government would give away some territory to Pakistan to reach an accord.

The Prime Minister also feels that the impression sought to be given by Gen. Musharraf that New Delhi was rigid, ought to be countered.

Agreeing that the ceasefire did not have the desired impact, Mr. Vajpayee said this should not inhibit the country from making fresh attempts. Earlier, speaking to the Press from Manali, the Prime Minister said the Government had initiated a dialogue with Pakistan after a thorough assessment of the ground realities and after taking opposition parties into confidence. He indicated that extending the ceasefire further might not lead to a greater advantage. “Gen. Musharraf has been saying of late that he is ready to meet the Indian leadership and the whole world had been insisting that when he is ready, India should also respond positively. So we have taken a step in that direction,” Mr. Vajpayee said.

Union Home Minister L.K. Advani told the media from Leh, the capital of Ladakh, on June 1 that Pakistan must realise India’s sincerity in pursuing peace and friendship. The Home Minister was in Ladakh to inaugurate the “Sindhu Darshan Festival” which he described as a symbol of national integration and unity. The festival has been given a political dimension by Mr. Advani. It commemorates the power and permanence of Indian civilization, combining religious devotion with the celebration of military might. The festival draws inspiration from divinity, the Vedas and the Hindu epic, Ramayana, and is projected by the BJP as the symbol of national integration. Sindhu is the ancient name of the river Indus.

The Defence and External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, at a crowded press conference on May 28, while reiterating India’s commitment to peace, insisted that it would not allow Islamabad to unilaterally define the terms of a renewed political engagement. India’s “bottom line” on the Kashmir dispute was the 1994 Parliamentary proclamation that the state was “an integral part of India.” This reaffirmation is believed to be in response to Pakistan Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar’s emphasis on “self-determination” for the people of Jammu and Kashmir and a “plebiscite” to facilitate it. On Islamabad’s formulation that Kashmir was the “core issue” in the dialogue, Mr. Singh said that was Pakistan’s position. “India does not believe in a denominational definition of nationalism.....Kashmir is at the core of the nationhood of India.” He described plans for a meeting between Hurriyat and Gen. Musharraf as a “non-issue”.

Mr. Singh suggested that India had put the bitterness of the Kargil episode behind and was ready to receive a man whom it saw as the architect of that aggression two years ago. Stressing the importance of moving beyond the confines of history, Mr. Singh averred that “unless we address the challenge of tomorrow, we will cause great damage to the people of the two nations.” It was for Pakistan now to make up its mind “on what kind of a relationship it wants with India and the rest of the world.



Ground situation : rise in violence

With the calling off of the ceasefire, Indian security forces have resumed their active operations. More than 25 militants have been eliminated in Poonch and Rajouri border districts alone. Most of those killed were foreign mercenaries. There have been setbacks as well, the most important being the grant of safe passage to militants of the Lashkar-e-Toiba after they had sought refuge in a mosque in the Kharwar area. There have been daring attempts by Hizbul Mujahideen militants, including an attack on the Union Minister of State, Mr. Omar Abdullah, on May 29.

Analysts are already predicting a hard summer for the security forces. The biggest challenge is the compulsion to conduct cordon and search operations in villages where militants have shifted their bases from the mountains during the ceasefire period. This will inevitably involve some pain for the common people. It is understood that Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah threatened to step down at a recent closed door meeting of the Unified Headquarters (UHQ) in Srinagar over what he called a rise in human rights violations by the security forces. The Union Home Minsiter was presiding over the meeting which took place on May 19.

According to government figures, there was a rise in incidents of grenade attack, bomb blast, arson, rocket attack and random firing during the ceasefire period. During the past 184 days since November 28 there were 2,124 such incidents as against 1,655 in the corresponding period prior to the ceasefire.

There were 230 grenade attacks, 193 bomb blasts, 123 cases of arson and 501 cases of random firing as against the 184, 144, 73 and 297, respectively, during the 184 days of the pre-ceasefire period.

Similarly, the rate of civilian killings jumped during the ceasefire. The figure was 547 as against 457 between May 28, 2000 and November 27, 2000. As many as 263 police and other security personnel were killed by the militants during the past six months as against 221 during the pre-ceasefire period.

While the rate of killing of security personnel and civilians increased, that of elimination of rebels during the ceasefire decreased. As many as 947 militants were killed by the security forces between May 28, 2000 and November 27, 2000 as against 588 during the past six months.

During the past six months, 181 militants were arrested as against 364 during the pre-ceasefire period. At least 79 rebels had surrendered before the security forces in various parts of the state six months before the ceasefire as against 33 in the past 184 days.

An indepth study of government reports indicates that the security forces carried out more specific operations against the rebels in Jammu during the six months of the ceasefire than in the Kashmir valley. Despite the fact that more areas in the valley were infested by militants than in the Jammu region, 282 rebels were killed in Kashmir as against 306 in Jammu.

Out of the 306 rebels eliminated during the past six months, 150 were killed in Poonch followed by 66 in Rajouri district. But those who do not see any alarming rise in the killing of security forces, including the police, explain that if during the ceasefire period 263 security personnel were killed, their number was over 246 between November 28, 1999, and May 30, 2000. The Army and the BSF suffered the highest casualty of 208 as against 196 during the past 184 days.

However, protagonists of an end to the ceasefire maintained that the rate of militants’ arrest, too, had dropped during the ceasefire. Between November 28, 1999, and May 2000, as many as 334 rebels had been arrested which further increased to 364 between May 28, 2000, and November 27, 2000. This fell to 181 during the ceasefire period. The figures of surrendered ultras were 41, 78 and 33 for the respective periods.

No doubt India had gained political mileage with the enforcement of the ceasefire, but ground realities, including negative response from separatists and rebels and the spread of activities of foreign mercenaries to other areas are said to have forced the Government to reject the demand for another extension.



The Pant initiative

The Government’s principal interlocutor on Kashmir, Mr. K.C. Pant, has concluded his six-day visit to the state, describing it as a successful experience. He heard diverse views, but noted an overwhelming desire of the people for peace and to speed up development and generate more job opportunities for the unemployed. The key expressions used by Mr. Pant were “understanding”, “peace is necessary for development”, and “creating an climate of trust and understanding to find an agreed solution to the tangle.” According to him most people were appreciative of the Prime Minister’s initiative, especially his invitation to Gen. Musharraf.

His mission was to try to understand the aspirations, problems and difficulties of the people of Kashmir and see how to make progress towards peace. He did manage to obtain the views of a large number of people, whether they were boatmen or traders. He had detailed interaction with several present and past political leaders, but the Hurriyat leadership declined to meet him, and this was a setback. Even the National Conference leadership showed a lack of interest in Mr. Pant’s visit. Reports suggest that the Chief Minister was not “totally” consulted when the ceasefire was enforced and when the decision to withdraw it was taken. He was also not taken into confidence in advance about the Srinagar visit schedule of Mr. Pant.

But there were gains as well. Mr. Pant met People’s Democratic Freedom Party (PDFP) chief Shabir Shah. The meeting was described as the beginning of the dialogue. Views were exchanged with Mr. Shabir Shah suggesting the repeal of the Disturbed Areas Act and the Armed Forces Act to create a conducive atmosphere of talks. He recommended the release of all political detenus and a stop to house-to-house searches. Lauding the Prime Minister’s initiative in inviting Gen. Musharraf, in a letter handed over to Mr. Pant, Shabir Shah said the high road to peace cannot be reached without involving Pakistan. He took exception to Mr. Jaswant Singh’s statement that Kashmir is an integral part of India.

Mr. Pant also met the Awami National Conference president and former Chief Minister, Mr. G.M. Shah, who also objected to Mr. Jaswant Singh’s remark. “What talks can be held when there are such statements being made from New Delhi? We will talk to one who admits that Kashmir is a problem”, Mr. Shah said.

Mr. Pant went to Ladakh where a memorandum demanding a Union Territory status for the region, drafted by 19 organisations, was handed over to him. During his four hour stay, he met representatives of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC), the Ladakh Buddhists Association (LBA), the Anjuman-e-Imamia, etc. Hundreds of people, including traders, came out on the streets demanding UT status for Ladakh. The Ladakh Muslim Association was, however, opposed to this demand as well as to the trifurcation of the State.

Even in Kargil, where Mr. Pant met a cross-section of political parties, religious bodies and associations, the overwhelming opinion was that the people wanted to be part of the state and were against any division of Jammu and Kashmir. But the Zanaskar Buddhists Association (ZBA) in a memorandum said that in case the people of Kargil do not support the UT demand, the Zanaskar valley should join Leh district. The Zanaskar valley comprises nearly 60 per cent of the total area of Kargil district, which remains cut off from the district for nearly eight months due to snow.

In Jammu, a very large number of delegations interacted with Mr. Pant with views ranging from a separate homeland to trifurcation. The Gujjars and the Panthers Party favoured separate statehood for Jammu; the Panun Kashmir organisation of Hindus supported the demand for a separate homeland for secular forces, especially Pandits, in the valley. The Front for Trilateral Resolution of the J & K Problem demanded independent status for the Kashmir Valley and maximum possible constitutional autonomy for other regions and ethnic groups.

Therefore, while Mr. Pant heard pro-Pak and pro-independence views in the Kashmir Valley, in Jammu the thrust was on separate statehood and at least regional councils. In Leh, the third region of J & K, the demand was for Union Territory status.



Hurriyat isolated but still relevant

The separatist Hurriyat Conference, comprising 23 organisations, has not responded to Mr. Pant’s letter to enter into a dialogue for the 1restoration of normalcy in the State. Its leadership has rejected the Prime Minister’s suggestion that the Hurriyat meet Mr. Pant first even as the Hurriyat chief, Prof. Abdul Ghani Bhat, went on record that the Pant exercise had no meaning and that they would like to meet both Mr. Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf. Former Hurriyat Chairman and senior Jamaat-e-Islami leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani has described the Pant exercise as futile since it does not address the “basic issue.”

The view of the Hurriyat Conference is that while they welcome the proposed summit between Prime Minister Vajpayee and Gen. Musharraf, no friendship is possible between the two countries unless the aspirations of the Kashmir people are addressed. The leadership says it is determined to meet Gen. Musharraf “even if impediments are raised by New Delhi.”

According to Kashmir watchers, it was expected that the All-Party Hurriyat Conference would reject Mr. Vajpayee’s suggestion that they should first talk to the Centre’s nominee, Mr. Pant, before seeking to meet the Pakistan military ruler when he visits Delhi. Although the APHC has been claiming from rooftops that it is the “true representative” of the Kashmiri people, there has never been any doubt that its apron strings are tied to Islamabad. Why did APHC leaders agitate to visit Pakistan before entering into any dialogue with the Government here? And, when New Delhi indicated its willingness to let an APHC delegation go to Islamabad, the Hurriyat adopted a confrontationist posture, insisting that permission be given to all the five members chosen by it. This stand was taken in full knowledge of New Delhi’s opposition to one of the nominees, Jamaat chief Ali Shah Geelani, known for his rabid anti-India views. In other words, the APHC has never been serious about a negotiated settlement of the insurgency problem in the Kashmir Valley. In effect, they have been looking to Pakistan to catapult them into a position where they can call the shots with the Government here. Also, it is widely known that they are mortally afraid of militants on the Pakistan ISI’s payroll and will do nothing to invite the ire of those mercenaries.

The invitation to the Pakistan military ruler, seen with the Pant mission, appears to have pushed the APHC to the background. But this may not seal the fate of the Hurriyat as the propounder of the Kashmiri cause i.e. the “struggle for right to self-determination”. Even as the Government of India wants to go both ways - with Pakistan as also the political groups in Kashmir - in which Mr. Shah has taken a lead in being first to open up the issue, the Hurriyat’s position may not be weak, according to some analysts.

A party recognised by the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) with observer status there and also being the combination of over 23 political, social and religious groups, the position of the Hurriyat vis-a-vis a separatist mood in Kashmir is unquestionable. It recently received a shot in the arm when Syed Ali Shah Geelani was nominated to the prestigious Riyadh-based World Muslim League. It, interestingly, came after External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh’s visit to Saudi Arabia.

Since Pakistan had been strongly supporting the Hurriyat proposal of allowing its members to visit Islamabad for consultations with the Government and militant leaders there, its position in ignoring the Hurriyat while opening the dialogue with New Delhi may become more vulnerable. On the other hand, all the Jehadi groups in Pakistan, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Jaish-e- Mohammad and the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, have sent a word of caution to Gen. Musharraf on the talks issue. These groups in the past have gone thick with the Hurriyat and appreciated its stand on the Indian offer.



In defence of the peace initiative

The situation in Kashmir is in a state of flux. To the credit of the Prime Minsiter and the Government, many initiatives have been taken in the past few years. That they have not succeeded is not the issue since the problem itself is acute and in many respects intractable. There are, therefore, naturally reservations about the new strategy. What is billed as a major initiative for peace seems at variance with the scrapping of the cease-fire, even though the latter was only partially successful. Sure there is cause to welcome the chance of reviving the bilateral dialogue with Pakistan, but India had insisted that the right climate for talks be created by Pakistan ending support to militancy. Has that climate been created? Not if the reasons advanced for scrapping the ceasefire are valid.

A certain inconsistency in approach is also evident. The military go-slow, and the subsequent attempt to open a dialogue with the secessionist forces had sent out a signal, that Pakistan was not the sole factor in the equation. That approach will be diluted now, not because of talks with Pakistan’s Chief Executive but because it was the ceasefire that contributed to some elements displaying an inclination to negotiate. To say that the process had made no headway would be incorrect, what more could have been expected in such a short period? The government says that K C Pant will continue his efforts, but the main focus now lies elsewhere, and the role of the representatives of the Kashmiri people - even if the claims to represent them are questionable - appears diminished.

But there is support for the Government. If the steps the government has taken are seen as tactical moves, they cannot be expected to be permanent. These measures would have to be judged instead on whether they achieved the tactical objectives laid out for them. And here the government may have had more success than is immediately apparent. The ceasefire is likely to have had two tactical objectives. It would have been expected to build international pressure on Pakistan as well as open a window for talks with the local Kashmiri leadership. And both these objectives have been met quite substantially.

The Pakistani leadership has been forced to appear reconciliatory. At the same time, though there has been little progress in getting the Hurriyat to the negotiating table, the government has been able to build new, if fragile, bridges with Shabir Shah.

This change in the relationship with the Kashmiri leadership, even if it is marginal, provides a different connotation to inviting Gen. Musharraf. An invitation for talks at the outset would have sent out the signal that peace in the Valley is entirely a matter to be decided at the international level. It may have even given the impression that Pakistan can speak on behalf of the Kashmiri people. But with the talks being initiated within the Valley first, it is clear that Pakistan is just one of the players. Pakistan’s involvement can then be confined to the international dimensions of the issue.

Such an approach will undoubtedly disappoint those who expect the meeting with Gen. Musharraf to provide a final solution. But such expectations are clearly unrealistic. Pakistan may not even believe it is in its interests to make the compromises required for a solution. The dispute in Kashmir helps Pakistan gain the attention of both China and the US. Thus while international opinion ensures that Pakistan has to make all the right peace noises, actual peace on the ground may see it losing its relevance on the geopolitical map.

Equally important, a bilateral solution to the dispute could unleash disruptive forces within Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir. The Kashmiri groups Pakistan has been nurturing include those who want independence for Kashmir. But independence is not what Pakistan wants. Any solution that satisfies Pakistan would thus force the pro-independence groups to turn their fire on Islamabad. And as India knows from its LTTE experience, terrorist groups have no hesitation in biting the hand that fed them.

The bleak prospects of an abiding solution may give the impression that the talks are no more than an exercise to please the international community. But such a view would be far too cynical. It must be remembered that the current initiative is based on the growing demand for peace from people in the valley. As the dialogue both with Pakistan and groups in Kashmir gathers momentum, those who stay out will be increasingly seen as opposing peace. And this is a pressure groups like the Hurriyat may not be able to withstand. The very process of talking therefore will have an impact, no matter how marginal, on conditions on the ground.