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Kashmir : Contours of a possible solution

	June 11, 2001

Even as the Pant mission has wound up its one-week tour of Jammu and Kashmir, the diplomatic ground is being prepared for the Vajpayee-Musharraf summit, militancy continues as do anti-militancy operations. The Army is planning to raise a special commando force of its own on the pattern of the National Security Guards and train them to flush out militants from mosques and shrines. The need for such a force arose after security forces last week decided to withdraw a cordon around a village mosque in the south of Kashmir after it had failed to get the locals to persuade foreign militants to vacate it. Army commanders withdrew because storming the mosque could have resulted in casualties and also damaged the place of worship. The Government obviously does not want to get on the wrong side of the general public.

Nevertheless, operations against militants have been stepped up and at least 70 militants have been killed since the withdrawal of the ceasefire on May 31. Most are foreign militants. Incidentally, 1049 people were killed during the ceasefire period, including 425 militants, 220 security personnel and 404 civilians.

Perhaps feeling the pressure from the security forces, militant outfits from across the border have sent instructions not to send “physically unfit youths to Kashmir for participating in the ongoing anti-India jehad.” Another message sent across the border is that agencies engaged in infiltrating groups of rebels into Jammu and Kashmir be properly trained in the handling of sophisticated wireless system that has been in the possession of district commanders of various militant outfits. It is understood that the Pakistani agencies have been rattled by the elimination of more than 220 militants in the last six months in Poonch and Rajouri districts alone. Consequently, the agencies across the border have been advised not to push more militants from Poonch and Rajouri. Since the number of militants belonging to different outfits is quite large in this area, it has given rise to inter-group clashes.



The Pant mission

The visit of Mr. K. C. Pant to J & K last week has, according to some observers, proved to be a diffused exercise that has been overtaken by events. True, he has indeed interacted with practically everyone and every group which had cared to meet him, but at best, the visit must have served as a “window of opportunity’ for Mr. Pant himself to get an insight into the perceptions and aspirations of various sections of the population in different regions. However, much of what he had heard during his interaction with mainstream political parties, civic bodies, pressure groups and outfits representing religious or regional interests is by no means new or profound. For instance, the suggestion for a trifurcation of the State and the sectarian demand for Ladakh being carved out as a Union Territory have been floating around for a long time now. Nor is it a revelation that the State in general and some regions in particular are crying for economic development. It is also common knowledge that this negligence of basic developmental needs and the resultant pervasive joblessness contributed not a little to the alienation of the people and, by extension, to the growth of militancy in the State. Given this context, yet another fact-finding exercise of the type Mr. Pant carried out appears redundant.

Yet Mr. Pant does appear to have started the process of understanding the Kashmir psyche. More importantly, by sending Pant to Kashmir, the Centre may have acknowledged that not everybody who thinks differently about the state’s future needs to be kept away from the negotiating table.

Mr. Pant has ruled out the possibility of a referendum as an option and said that there is no scope for any talks with the “merchants of death” from across the border while reiterating that the doors are not shut for dialogue with Kashmiri militants who are desirous of peace. Mr. Pant had some harsh words for the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), questioning its claim of being the sole representative of the people of the state. According to him, this is not reflected in the ground situation. “Groups and individuals who came to talk to me told me that the Hurriyat has no role in deciding on their future”, Mr. Pant said.

Reacting to this, the People’s Conference Chairman, Abdul Gani Lone, voiced his willingness to contest Assembly elections provided these were held under the supervision of an international agency. He was perhaps echoing the sentiments of other Hurriyat leaders besides the chief of the Democratic Freedom Party, Shabir Shah. He criticised Mr. Pant for saying that the APHC has no representative character in the valley. In fact, Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah had also announced that he would dissolve the Assembly and order an early poll if the separatists, especially the APHC, agreed to contest the elections. Incidentally, the Union Home Minister L.K. Advani, has also ruled out the holding of elections in Jammu and Kashmir under international supervision as sought by the Hurriyat.



Expectations from Vajpayee-Musharraf summit

Meanwhile, in a significant stance, Jamaat-e-Islami leader and a member of the Hurriyat executive, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, demanded on June 8 that India and Pakistan withdraw their troops from Jammu and Kashmir as a prelude to the proposed summit between Prime Minister Vajpayee and General Musharraf. Geelani has always been known to be an advocate of Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, and this is the first time that he has called upon Pakistan to withdraw its troops from Kashmir. The statement is certain to ruffle jehadis in Pakistan. Geelani also stressed that Kashmiris should be allowed to exercise their choice through a plebiscite. The hardline Hurriyat leader rejected options like converting the line of control into an international border, granting of internal autonomy and transfer of power through elections.

The Hurriyat Conference has demanded its involvement in the Vajpayee-Musharraf talks. The assessment is that its leaders will not create any unnecessary controversy during the Musharraf visit because they would not wish to be accused of creating bad blood between India and Pakistan. The Hurriyat leaders are generally optimistic about the summit and feel it will generate an atmosphere of trust between the two countries and pave the way for a meaningful dialogue on Kashmir.

In fact, a majority of the people has started nursing great expectations from the summit. These expectations were totally missing when the Prime Minister announced a unilateral ceasefire on November 27, 2000. The element of hope was absent even when the Indian government appointed Mr. Pant as its chief negotiator. According to a survey conducted by the newspaper The Tribune, the basic reason for people’s expectations from the summit is that the decade-long turmoil has convinced them that cooperation from Pakistan alone could help restore peace in the state. Various initiatives of the Central Government since 1990 have failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute. These initiatives include pro-active policy against militants, the Government ordering Assembly elections in October 1996 and the Lahore initiative. Even the Hizbul Mujahideen has stated that it will stop operations if there is a positive development from the proposed high level talks. This indicated that not only the mainstream political organisations, but even the militants having roots in the state are of the opinion that Pakistan alone could resolve the basic conflict.

The Pakistan-based militant groups are not so optimistic about the outcome of the summit. In fact, even the valley-based militant groups boycotted the Pant Mission. According to some observers, the government’s abrupt change of tack - as reflected in the termination of the six-month-old unilateral ceasefire and in the Prime Minister’s snap decision to invite Pakistan’s Chief Executive for talks - sent confusing signals to them about the Centre’s strategy. The impending Vajpayee-Musharraf summit inevitably shifted the focus away from the internal dialogue track pursued by Mr. Pant,

For its part, the All Party Hurriyat Conference - the separatist umbrella outfit that is sharply divided between the pro- independence and pro-Pakistan factions - found itself caught in a cleft stick, so to say, in the wake of the summit call which it perceived as the Vajpayee regime’s counter to its persistent demand for a visit to Pakistan to work for ‘peace’ between the two countries.

The rigid stand of the Hurriyat has been criticised by most of the Indian media. According to them, till now, the APHC had been playing games and pretending to hold the key to open the lock of Pakistani intransigence. That bluff has now been called. Even Pakistan accepts that in talks between Heads of Government, the APHC is an unwelcome interloper. For this, the APHC has only itself to blame. It made the mistake of assuming that India would never invite Pakistan for talks and that if it did the latter would insist on the Hurriyat Conference’s presence at the table.

It is surprising that the APHC has been showing such a lack of realism as not to realise that however long the solution may be in coming, no Government in India or for that matter in Pakistan could agree to independence for Jammu and Kashmir.

It is doubtful if the APHC ever had a mass base. A desperate group, the Hurriyat, by a quirk of circumstances, was broadly seen to reflect the anger and dissatisfaction with the security forces and the Centre. It had no agenda, no mass programme. The Hurriyat conference should have taken an independent initiative, undeterred by the militant threat, to join in the Pant talks and set an agenda for improving the conditions in the State.

The invitation to Gen. Pervez Musharraf by the Government of India has naturally raised intense speculation as to the motivation and the results that might follow. The areas of agreement between Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris could point to a way ahead.

Four areas of agreement exist. First, India and Pakistan oppose outright independence for J&K. Pakistanis want a plebiscite on the status of Kashmir, but they expect and would like the state to join Pakistan. It is doubtful that Islamabad would accept a truly sovereign Kashmir. Second, no one is happy with the status quo. Even Indians admit that things have to change after a bloody 12-year rebellion in the state. Third, Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris concede that a final disposition of Kashmir must involve all three. Fourth, and crucially, most Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris do not want the Line of Control (LoC) converted into an international boundary (IB). The Indian Parliament’s resolution of 1994 attests to India’s opposition. Pakistan’s rejection of the idea is well known. And the most powerful voices in Kashmir are adamantly against partition.

Mr Kanti Bajpai, an expert in foreign affairs and who teaches in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), says these agreements are a base on which a long-term, seven-part settlement can be built.

First, rejection of the LoC’s conversion into an IB is the central principle on which a solution should be constructed. All three parties would accept that the LoC will remain in place without prejudice to the final disposition of the state, whenever that may be.

Second, at the same time, the LoC would be “transcended” by the institution of “soft borders”, that is, by entry points allowing for the flow of goods and people. This would restore a common social and economic life to Kashmir and even a shared municipal life. Kashmiris could come together to plan for local public services and facilities, including power generation.

The third element is autonomy in both Kashmiris. India and Pakistan would, in parallel, give Kashmiris autonomy as in the original Indian constitutional dispensation. New Delhi and Islamabad would have authority only over defence and foreign policy. Accompanying this new constitutional structure would be free and fair elections. Elections would be conducted by the respective national election commissions and monitored by an independent group of Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. Both India and Pakistan would commit to regular and proper elections.

Fourth, on Kashmir’s defence and foreign affairs, India and Pakistan would work together and with Kashmiris. The joint defence council that operated briefly after Partition could be revived for the purposes of consultation and coordination between New Delhi and Islamabad. Kashmiri representatives would also sit on this council. Internal security would primarily be the responsibility of the Kashmir police. Similarly, on foreign affairs, Kashmir would abide by treaties and agreements signed by India and Pakistan and would be consulted on future agreements. New Delhi and Islamabad would collaborate on crucial external issues as they arose. A solution to Siachen and Wular/Tulbul would be part of the new collaboration. In addition, Kashmir could be given some kind of “international personality”.

Fifth, the diversity of Kashmir needs recognition and accommodation. Jammu, Ladakh and the Northern Areas would become “Union Territories”. These would be administered by India and Pakistan in cooperation with local bodies modelled on “autonomous councils”, as in various parts of India.

Sixth, Kashmir would be demilitarised. This means the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani military and paramilitary forces from the state. Law and order would be the responsibility of the Kashmir police. New Delhi and Islamabad would have to be content with the notion that, if anything went drastically against their interests in a military sense, they would still have the capacity to intervene massively in Kashmir.

Seventh, conditions would have to be created for the return and restitution of Kashmiri Pandits who left the state and lost their livelihood and property. It goes without saying that any future political structure for Kashmir, on both sides, must be protected.