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Kashmir: Close aide of Hurriyat leader shot dead |
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The killing of Pir Hisamuddin, a relative and close aide of hardline Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Geelani, by unidentified gunmen at his residence last week, may force Geelani to raise his anti-India rhetoric and further harden his stance on the Kashmir issue. Hisamuddin, an advocate, had been working with Geelani for the last 35 years. Geelani’s supporters blamed security agencies for the killing, saying it was designed to weaken their party’s resolve.
Sources in the Union Home Ministry have termed the killing of Pir Hissamuddin in Srinagar as “a major setback” to Geelani, the pro-Pakistan Hurriyat leader. Though he was known as the “political secretary” to Geelani, the Pir was essentially “the money man.” The killing, according to these sources, most probably has to do with some dispute over the distribution of money among the various terror groups. The Pir used to be the contact man for various militant `tanzeems’ (organisations).
The dispute is being linked to a larger split within the hardliner camp. According to information, pro-Pakistan elements had a major row a few days ago when Pir Hisamuddin was reported to have spoken against Geelani. The Pir came close to accusing Geelani of “misallocating” funds (received from Pakistani sources).
Meanwhile, Home Minister Shivraj Patil has rescheduled his visit to Jammu and Kashmir to October 23. Earlier slated to visit the state on September 24, he had to postpone his trip due to by-elections in the state on October 13. Due to the EC’s model code of conduct, both Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Patil were forced to postpone their visit. The Home Minister would go for three days and tour the border areas. He would also meet officials in the Valley, besides attending a meeting of the Unified Command.
Is lasting peace possible
The peace talks with the Hurriyat have obviously suffered a setback. But the key to a solution to Kashmir remains with Pakistan. Analyst Vir Sanghvi while analysing the present status of talks with Pakistan is of the firm opinion that neither of the two most commonly-held positions about Pakistan within the Indian establishment can lead to a lasting peace.
Position one is what he calls the Peacenik Position. Broadly, this States that all Pakistanis want to have better relations with India. But, or so the argument goes, India must also appear to be flexible. India must concede that there is a genuine dispute over Kashmir and must agree to talk about it. In the end, all this won’t make much difference because Pakistanis are realists. They know that the only lasting solution to the problem is the one agreed to by Z.A. Bhutto in Simla in 1972: turn the LOC into an international border. Nevertheless, they must show their people that they’ve tried to do something and so, we must go through the motions of talking.
Somehow, Vir Sanghvi finds it hard to accept that having fought three wars over Kashmir and having fed its people on the hope that one day, the Indians will be driven out of the state, Pakistan will agree to just let the matter drop after a year or so of token negotiations.
Position two, according to the analyst, is the view of the Indian security establishment. This is much better thought-out. According to this position, the Pakistani army will always be reluctant to give up on Kashmir because it needs the Indian threat to maintain its pre-eminent position in Pakistani society. So, no solution, short of withdrawal from the Valley, will be acceptable to the army.
Given that withdrawal is not a solution that any Indian will accept, we must find ways of managing the Kashmir situation. It may cost hundred of crores of rupees and claim the lives of many Indian soldiers but if we can restore some semblance of security to the valley, then the average Kashmiri will forget about azaadi. Already, support for the militancy is down because Kashmiris are enjoying one of the fruits of security and peace: a great tourist season.
If we can manage Kashmir, then there are only two things Pakistan can do. The first is, of course, to use international pressure. But we’ve resisted such pressure for over 50 years.
Vir Sanghvi says as well reasoned as this position is, it also confirms the worst fears of the Pakistanis: India’s idea of a Kashmir solution is status quo in the valley plus improvement in other areas. It is exactly the sort of thing that Musharraf complained about in Agra.
About the Pakistanis, the analyst feels they are serious about Kashmir. They will not abandon it after a year or so of negotiations. And yet, all Indian political parties are committed to the hardest possible line on Kashmir. As far as we are concerned, Kashmir is an integral part of India and the problem will only end when Pakistan recognises that.
As long as these positions remain cast in stone, no peace process will work beyond the first few rounds. If the process is to ever go beyond the initial pleasantries and the talk of cultural exchanges, then we must build a consensus in India over what we can offer Pakistan on Kashmir. Obviously we can’t give up the Valley but equally there must be other concessions that we can offer. Yet no government is prepared to even begin a debate within India over possible concessions. And without such a debate, there can be no national consensus.
All this is not to say that India’s position is a weak one. If we take the view that it is best to manage the Kashmir situation with arms and money, then I don’t think that there’s very much that Pakistan can do about it in the long run. We can certainly hold on to Kashmir on our own terms.
But equally, if that it is indeed our position, then we should not be surprised if the Pakistanis lose interest in the peace process by early next year, when they recognise that we are not ready to concede an inch.
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