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Insurgency : Dhaka’s tacit operations |
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Once again, news that otherwise has serious ramifications for Indo-Bangladesh trans-border terror politics, has come to be hotly contested by authorities in Dhaka. On the night of July 17, 2004, there were multiple attacks by unidentified gunmen in Dhaka’s Segun Bagicha, Dhanmondi and Shyamali localities, in which an indefinite number, reportedly up to 24, of separatist militants from Northeast India were killed and several others were wounded.
News about this incident originated from Guwahati and Agartala, capitals of the Northeast Indian States of Assam and Tripura respectively, citing senior police and intelligence sources. The incidents had been confirmed - though fatalities reported were much lower-in initial reports by Bangladeshi newspapers including Inquilab, Daily Ittefaq, Janakantha, Daily Prothombhor, and Ajker Kagoz. Most such publications, however, have since “retracted” their reports, possibly under the Government’s pressure.
Reports received indicate that rebels of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), had gathered for a meeting in the Bangladeshi capital when they came under attack in four separate locations, leading to the death of at least 24 militants. Some reports suggest that most of those killed were ULFA cadres. Bangladesh was quick to deny that anything of that sort had happened. Dhaka Police Commissioner Ashraful Huda was quoted by an international news agency, saying, “There is no truth to these claims.”
Indian sources are sticking to their story about the July 17 incident. There are reports of increased vigil along the porous Indo-Bangladesh border that runs 4,095 kilometres along the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram and West Bengal. Mr SC Srivastava, Inspector General of the BSF’s Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur and Nagaland frontier, stated: “We have already alerted the border outposts after the killings (in Dhaka).” There have been several such incidents in the past involving Northeast Indian insurgents in Bangladesh, which authorities in India insist did happen, and Dhaka, as always, flatly denies.
Despite Bangladesh’s “undiluted” position that no Indian insurgents were operating from within its territory, New Delhi has been firm in insisting that there were, at last count, at least 210 camps of various Northeast Indian rebel groups in that country, and cite a number of incidents to reinforce their claim. The most significant among these are the multiple incidents of January 2, 2004: Bangladesh Rifles raided a hideout of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and captured six of its cadres and seized some weapons. According to reports originating from Bangladesh, the NLFT camp was located near Karisapunji village under Chunarughat upazilla in Habiganj district. The United News of Bangladesh identified those arrested as Kokek Tripura (22), Philip Debbarma (24), Manjak Debbarma (20), Bukhuk Debbarma (24), Satish Debbarma (25) and Shoilen Debbarma (25).
In the second incident, the rebel ATTF “Chief”, Ranjit Debbarma’s residence in Dhaka came under grenade attack. Indian media reports indicated that five ATTF rebels were killed in that attack and eight others, including Debbarma, were wounded.
On the same day, Bangladeshi security forces reportedly arrested 34 rebels belonging to ULFA, from different parts of Dhaka. Bangladeshi newspapers, including Jugantar, quoted police officials as saying the militants were arrested after raids at different places including Mohammedpur, Green Road and Gulshan, all upmarket localities. According to Jugantar, four people who were caught while making bombs at a house in the city’s Mohammedpur area, later received treatment at the Suhrawardy Hospital, concealing their identities.
Dhaka chose to remain silent on the raid and the arrest of six NLFT rebels, as well as the bomb attack on the residence of the ATTF chief. However, Bangladesh did come out with a formal denial of reports about the arrest of 34 ULFA militants in Dhaka. “We would like to categorically state that the reports (about the ULFA rebels capture) are false, baseless and concocted and have been fabricated to strain the friendly relations between Bangladesh and India.
“No such incidents took place in the capital city of Dhaka,” a Home Ministry Press Release issued in Dhaka on January 3, 2004, said. The Bangladesh Home Ministry statement added: “We would also like to reassert the well-known position of the Government of Bangladesh that Bangladesh has never allowed or assisted insurgent groups of any country for acts against that country and this policy was being pursued by the Government consistently and rigorously.”
Earlier, on May 27, 2003, a major attack had occurred at the heavily guarded Purbanchal Complex in the Uttara Colony in Dhaka, provided by the Bangladesh Government as a safe-house and coordination centre to ULFA “chief”, Paresh Baruah. Eight persons, possibly including some operatives of the Bangladeshi Directorate of Field Intelligence and Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), were believed to have been killed in this attack. Baruah himself was believed to have been injured. Dhaka, however, staunchly denied the incident-even though it was later confirmed by Baruah in interviews to various news agencies and papers.
It is likely that Dhaka would continue to hold on to its position that Indian insurgents were not operating from the country. Under the circumstances, things are not going to move beyond claims and counter-claims. There is little scope in international law that could allow New Delhi to ascertain the identity of those of its citizens who it insists get killed from time to time in alleged shootouts inside Bangladesh. Any confirmation that these are separatist militants is nigh impossible without explicit-highly improbable-cooperation from Bangladeshi authorities.
Bangladesh has sought to dismiss reports on the July 17 attacks, as well as a number of past incidents, as part of an Indian “propaganda campaign” and a “conspiracy by India’s intelligence agencies” to unjustifiably project the country as unstable and extremist in orientation. However, simple denials or “dismissals” of Indian claims of anti-India militants operating from that country cannot hold good for long. With reports of Northeast Indian insurgents getting involved in shootouts inside Bangladesh more rapidly than ever, Dhaka will eventually have to come clean on the issue.
It would be better sooner than later. Considering the increasing and adverse international attention Bangladesh has been attracting as an “emerging hub of Islamist terror”, the case becomes more urgent. The publication of a report by the Canadian Intelligence Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in December 2003, US advisories to its citizens and officials posted in or visiting Bangladesh, as well as a slew of reports and articles in the international press over the past year and more have been deeply embarrassing for Dhaka. There is a growing perception in the global community that the Government is not willing to take firm action against terrorists and religious extremists operating in the country, as well as of deepening linkages between extremist Islamist groups and sections of the Government itself.
There is also increasing evidence of Bangladesh emerging as a major transit centre for the illegal trade in small arms. Under the circumstances, Dhaka can ill-afford the unsustainable pretence that rebels from across the border in India’s Northeast have not been given a free run in parts of the country. To the extent that all such extremists elements are, in some measure, uncontrollable, it is inevitable that their continued presence and apparent immunity from the law will periodically spill over into violence that will not only prove impossible to conceal, but eventually impact the internal security situation in Bangladesh directly.
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