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Indo-US : Powell promises to lift sanctions |
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Prospects of an early lifting of post-Pokhran US sanctions against India have brightened with the new Secretary of State, Gen. Colin Powell announcing that the Bush Administration, which was inaugurated on Jan. 20, would initiate a speedy review. The other sore point in Indo-American relations over the Comprehensive Test ban treaty [CTBT] is also set to disappear with Gen. Powell reiterating the Republican’ own opposition to the treaty.
At his Senate confirmation hearing on Jan. 18, replying to a question by Senator Sam Brownback whether the Bush Administration would lift sanction against India, Powell said, the new Administration would review all the sanctions especially with respect to India so as to see whether it is the time to move forward and remove the remaining sanctions that are in place. He, however, said, he was not in a position to give any immediate commitment to end sanctions. Regretting the trigger-happy attitude of Congress members where sanctions were concerned, he said, there were too many embargoes against too many countries and pledged to review all of them. Every sanction, he said, must have a “sunset clause” at the end of which it should automatically cease to be in force or be renewed, he said. Powell also indicated that the CTBT will not be brought up in the next session of the Congress.
He said, Washington should engage more broadly with India which he described as “a powerful and nuclear armed country”. Stressing that India had the potential to help keep peace in the Indian Ocean area and its periphery, Powell said, “We need to work harder and more consistently to assist India in this endeavour while not neglecting our friends in Pakistan.” Powell, the first Black American to be nominated Secretary of State, said, the Bush Administration should deal more widely with India keeping in view the vast potential in the Indian Ocean and its periphery. “India is a country that should grow more and be more focussed in the lens of our foreign policy,” he said.
Touching upon other countries in Asia, Mr. Powell said, China was not an enemy and our challenge is to keep it that way. He said, China was also not a strategic partner nor the US inevitable. Significantly, the outgoing president Clinton had hailed China as a “strategic partner” who played a “positive role” in South Asia. Referring to Taiwan and the one-china policy, he said, the US had long acknowledged that there was only one China and how they resolve their differences is upto them. He indicated that the US national Missile Defence shield would not be shelved despite opposition from China and Russia. China in its reaction said, it disagrees with Powell’s observations that Beijing could not become Washington’ “strategic partner”. Foreign Ministry spokesman said in Beijing, the development of “sound and stable cooperation” between China and the US “conforms with interests of the two countries and is also conducive to peace and stability in Asia-pacific and the world at large.
Returning to the sanctions issue, the US ambassador to India has also described imposition of sanctions by his country a mistake. Speaking at a gathering in Kolkata on Jan. 12, he said, the sanctions had been “an emotional decision, a reaction to being aggrieved, spurned and deceived by our Indian friends”. He admitted that the sanctions imposed on the Indian scientists to travel to the US and transfer of technology were a mistake and said, the new Bush Administration will have to decide early whether or not to continue the sanctions.
The newly-elected co-chairman of the Congressional caucus on India and Indian Americans, Republican Congressman Ed Royce, who is a strong supporter of George W. Bush, has also supported the idea of lifting sanctions and said, it would be a good move for the new Bush administration to begin a fresh start.
Political observers say, the warm manner in which Gen. Powell responded to Senator Sam Brownback’s suggestion on lifting the sanctions is a sure sign that the Bush Administration would build upon the turnaround in ties, fashioned by the Clinton regime over the past one year. That the sanctions issue is sticking out like a sore thumb in the otherwise warm bilateral relations has been recognized by Washington for some time now. Yet, the Clinton regime, even while issuing a number of waivers, was averse to a wholesale lifting of sanction without India signing the CTBT. The key action still in place are in the sphere of defence and scientific research, chiefly in strategic areas. However, with the Republicans having rejected the CTBT in its present form, the Us pre-condition of signing the treaty will be out of the way, thus clearing the decks for lifting the sanctions. As remarked by Colin Powell in his confirmation hearing, the Bush Administration will not bring before the Senate the CTBT for ratification.
Reprieve from CTBT
The decision of the new Bush Administration, as revealed by Gen. Colin Powell, not to submit CTBT to the Senate for ratification means the Treaty, the centre of so much hectic diplomacy these past few years, is a dead letter. Political observers say, if Mr. Bush does not present the treaty to the Senate, the US cannot ratify the treaty. this in turn means that whatever slender hope it had of coming into force is now gone. The resistance of countries like India or North Korea had put a question mark over the treaty. But, without the support of the world’s only superpower, the question mark has become a guillotine blade. This does not mean an immediate resumption of nuclear testing. Mr. Powell ruled out more tests by the United States. India is still bound by its unilateral moratorium. The CTBT is dead, but an unwritten norm to not test still lives.
What remains unclear is whether the Bush administration will pursue the other elements of the nuclear non-proliferation regime like the fissile materials cut-off treaty. While campaigning, Mr. Bush spoke of reducing the US’s nuclear arsenal and to pursue the latter goal. It is less clear if it will carry out the former. A lot will depend on whether other countries will respond to missile defences by increasing their own nuclear arsenals.
US planned to nuclearise India
In a related development, the recently-declassified documents of the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson presidencies indicate that alarmed by the rapid development of China’s nuclear plan from 1960 to 64, they considered bombing facilities there and killing the experts as well as supplying India with nuclear weapons. However, all options were rejected as too risky, according to documents obtained by researchers at the independent National Security Archive and used as the basis for an article appearing in International security, a Harvard University publication. The declassified documents indicated that Pentagon officials expressed concern about Communist China’s nuclear plan as early as February., 1961, when Air Force planners said a CIA estimate that China could have the bomb as early as 1963 was too conservative and predicted bomb testing as early as that year.
Change in paradigm of Indo-US ties in Clinton era
The dramatic shift in US policy towards India took place in the second term of President Clinton when he consciously decided to transform Indo-US relations by delinking it from the India-Pakistan straight jacket and an overly arms control approach. The new policy received a setback with India’s May 1998 nuclear tests, but was quickly put back on track by Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott talks which led to the “first sustained strategic dialogue” between the two sides. The Indo-US pact was sealed and strengthened by the kargil episode which was also an eye opener for Washington and led it recasting its whole approach to the area by looking at New Delhi as a credible and responsible power.
According to an inside story of the Clinton Administration, the dramatic shift in US policy began at the start of his second term and was primarily driven by the President himself. The change was engendered by the President’s own reading and understanding of the region’s history and vibrancy of India’s plural, multi-hued democracy, the First Lady’s accounts of her visit to India and their interactions with key and unidentified Indians. At a meeting in the White House during the spring of 1997, it was decided that the US relations with India would be delinked from its ties with Pakistan and it was decided that Washington’s overbearing approach had been futile. While continuing to push its arms control agenda, the US would adopt a multi-basket approach. to convey this sense, it was decided to send Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and US ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, to the region. Unfortunately, the new tack was scuppered by India’s unexpected nuclear test in May, 1998 that came within days of Richardson’s visit. Richardson’s report on his return had been so gungho about India that the sudden tests shocked the administration ad there was a pervasive feeling of betrayal. However, it was President Clinton again who decided that the nuclear hump could and should be overcome. He deputed his college-mate Strobe Talbott to begin talks with India, who had as many as a dozen rounds of talks with External Affairs Minister, Mr. Jaswant Singh, during which the latter convinced him that India did not pose a threat to any country, that it did not harbour military ambition and that the tests had been undertaken to provide the country a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to ward off threat of a nuclear attack from some neighbouring countries already equipped with nuclear weapon. Difficulties in signing the CTBT in the absence of national consensus were also explained.
The Kargil episode subsequently was the single most important factor in transforming the relationship from “words to action.” First of all, kargil was an eye opener to Washington. The facts were relatively straight that Pakistan was the aggressor. But, what really helped build the Indo-US compact were two factors. The US came out unequivocally against Pak aggression. India’s measured response impressed Washington. US pressure on Pakistan was so intense that Sharif sought to fly to Washington to plead his case. Clinton’s message was direct: Come only if you will agree to withdraw. Islamabad was also told that it would be responsible for any consequences arising from its aggression. The kargil episode instilled a new sense of confidence that the two sides could wok together in handling tough situations. That sense was further strengthened during the kandahar hijacking when India was again a victim of terrorism. It was during this episode that Washington came close to directly accusing Pakistan of terrorism by declaring that the hijackers had the backing of some section of the Pakistani army and intelligence. Clinton’s visit to India in the spring of 2000 was successful beyond wildest expectations. The massacre in Chittisingpora at the start of the trip shook the Americans but made the President even more determined to reach out to the Indian people. The Indo-US engagement were rounded off by Prime Minister Vajpayee’s reciprocal visit to the US in the fall, a trip officials described as “very successful”.
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