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Indo-Pak relations : Critical juncture for options |
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J.N. Dixit, former Foreign Secretary & Chairman Editorial Board
Distances lend perspectives and endow processes of cognition with some detachment. I left Delhi for the United States a day after the terrorist attack on our Parliament on December 13, 2001. What was most noteworthy in US reactions in this development was the undercurrent of self-centred focus than any critical understanding of the trauma which India went through. The US Government and media had only two concerns - first that the attack on the Indian Parliament should not lead to an Indo-Pakistan war which may explode into a nuclear conflict. Second, Indian punitive actions against Pakistan may result in the latter diverting its political attention and its security forces to counter India which may result in a disruption of America’s ongoing anti-terrorist military campaign in Afghanistan. Governmental advice from America to India and Pakistan to act with patience and restraint had the full support of the US media. There was also reticence about acknowledging Pakistan’s links with the terrorist organizations which attacked the Indian Parliament. It must, however, be acknowledged that President Bush and senior figures of the US Government were categorical in their condemnation and criticism of the attack on the Indian Parliament. Spokespersons of the State Department stated on January 8 that General Musharraf’s and Pakistan’s future welfare will depend on how effectively he (Musharraf) deals with terrorism in his country. Musharraf’s speech of January 12 was a response to this US pressure. One has to wait and see how he translates his speech into action.
It is in this context that one views developments in Indo-Pak relations since December 13 and speculates on their prospects.
The terrorists who attacked the Indian Parliament were clearly members of the Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. Funding and organisation of the attack had the clear stamp of operational support from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan. The attack on the Indian Parliament following the attack by the same terrorist groups on the Legislative Assembly building of Jammu and Kashmir in Srinagar in October signified the intention of Pakistan-based terrorist groups to qualitatively escalate levels of violence against the Indian State. The objective changed from that of terrorising civilians and putting Indian security forces on the defensive, to one of disrupting the institutional framework of Indian democracy and to destabilising the political cohesion of the country. That this violence was perpetrated even as Pakistan was supporting the anti-terrorist campaign of the United States, was aimed at proving General Musharraf’s claim that the militants operating against India were not terrorists, did not have links with Pakistan, and that they were indigenous Kashmiris whom Islamabad could not control.
India’s strong political and operational response over the last month is logical as it had to counter the motivations and objectives of Pakistani strategies.
Prime Minister Vajpayee described the attack on Parliament as a direct attack on the nerve centre of Indian democracy. He declared that India’s fight against terrorism is entering its last phase, announcing that New Delhi would take appropriate corrective action at a place and time of its choice. Gen. Musharraf was politically adroit in his response. He condemned the terrorist act and conveyed his sympathy and support. He was prompt in informing the United States and other major powers of his reaction to the December 13 incident. His reaction was a calculated political and cosmetic exercise. When India demanded that Musharraf ban the Lashkar and the Jaish and that he should arrest and extradite the terrorists of these groups for trial in India, he asked for specific evidence. He did not consider the evidence conveyed by India based on intercepts of messages and the documentary proof of linkages between the terrorists who attacked Parliament and the headquarters of the organizations in Pakistan as sufficient. It is only after President Bush brought the Jaish and the Lashkar on to the list of terrorist organizations; and only after the US Government froze the assets of these entities that Musharraf fell in line. He put the leaders of the Jaish and Lashkar under house arrest. He has also detained about 300 members of the various Islamic militant groups according to latest reports.
Other pressure generated on him was the graduated but incremental diplomatic and political action taken by New Delhi. India withdrew its High Commissioner, Vijay Nambiar, from Pakistan. We decided to ban overflights by Pakistani civilian commercial aircraft through Indian airspace. India also decided to indefinitely suspend bus and train services to Pakistan. India has decided to reduce the staff strength of its diplomatic mission in Islamabad, asking Pakistan to do the same regarding its High Commission in New Delhi. India has also suspended certain bilateral trading arrangements with Pakistan. The message to Islamabad was that India is not interested in maintaining a formal and cosmetic relationship with Pakistan while it continues to subvert India. The second element in the message was that New Delhi would be serious in considering the entire range of punitive actions to counter Pakistani subversion and challenges against India’s unity and territorial integrity. There has also been an augmentation and strengthening of security and armed forces on the Line of Control and all along the Indo-Pakistan international border.
Pakistan’s undertaking parallel deployment is as expected. There are reports that Pakistani troops from the Multan and Kharian cantonments have moved to forward positions and that the Pakistani military airbase at Sargodha has gone into an operational mode. There have also been reports of the civilian population on both sides of the border evacuating their villages. There is no denying the fact that there is a palpable heightening of tensions between India and Pakistan. The US and other major powers are concerned about these developments. Vajpayee and Musharraf, as well as Foreign Ministers Jaswant Singh and Abdul Sattar, have been contacted by their counterparts from the US and other important governments with advocacy for patience and restraint.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s visit to India and Pakistan in the first week of January added insistence to this advice.
It is necessary for both Pakistan and India to move beyond current short-term diplomatic, political and military moves. The critical and traumatic threshold in Indo-Pak relations generated by the attack on Parliament provides both countries with an opportunity, even an incentive, to move towards bold options to get out of the rut of their adversarial relationship. Civil society in Pakistan is sharply fractious due to the contradiction between the forces of moderation and religious fanaticism.
The international campaign against terrorism provides Musharraf with the opportunity to act decisively against extremism and fanatical violence. Whatever his compulsions of domestic pressure, he would do well to proscribe Islamic militant organizations in his country. He would indeed be taking a substantially positive step in normalising Indo-Pak relations if he arrests Dawood Ibrahim, Masood Azhar and Sikh terrorists like Wadhawan Singh Babbar, and extradite them to India. He should stop supporting militant organizations in Jammu and Kashmir financially and militarily. While doing so he could suggest the revival of the Indo-Pak dialogue. It is obvious that India would not be taken in by what Musharraf says for public and international consumption. India would respond to what he actually does on the ground.
India, on its part, while remaining alert about countering terrorism, should revive its focus on the political dialogue with dissident elements in Kashmir to find a solution responsive to their aspirations. Though the period between November and February every year is a period of military exercises in Pakistan and India, the latter must examine the possibilities of moving back from forward military deployment postures, in consultation with Islamabad to ensure that Pakistani forces also move back. This could be done by reviving contacts between the Directors-General of Military Operations of both the countries.
That Vajpayee and Jaswant Singh did not avoid contact with Musharraf and Sattar completely during the recent SAARC summit in Kathmandu, was a practical approach This should be followed by at least three steps. India should send back its High Commissioner to Islamabad in the context of Pakistan not having withdrawn its High Commissioner. After a brief gap, we should also consider restoring the train and bus services as well as overflight facilities for Pakistani commercial aircraft because these facilities affect the common people of both the countries. The Indo-Pak dialogue should also be revived by the spring or summer of this year, possibly at the level of Foreign Secretaries.
While there should be no erosion of our will to act decisively against any terrorist threat, it is time for Pakistan to give deep thought about moving away from its adversarial and subversive policy towards India. It is equally important that India addresses the problems of Jammu and Kashmir with political insight and maintains a measured and practical political and military posture in relation to Pakistan. Sabre-rattling cannot be a substitute for a meaningful policy.
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