Contrary to all expectations that the Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan would be just another futile bid by Islamabad to make New Delhi return to the negotiating table suspended after the Mumbai terror attacks, Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh gave a categorical nod for the go-ahead. A joint statement issued after their talks, conveyed the decision to resume the composite dialogues. Prime Minister Singh himself later confirmed this while talking to newsmen after the Sharm-el-Sheikh meeting in Egypt that the Foreign Ministers of the two countries will meet on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly session in New York, and before this, their Foreign Secretaries, will work out the modalities for the resumption of the talks.
This is a dramatic reversal of the Indian position obtaining till now. Earlier, New Delhi officially stipulated and reiterated at every opportunity, that the composite dialogue could be resumed only if Pakistan gave concrete proof of moving against its nationals who attacked Mumbai and of dismantling the structure of terrorism on soil.
Pakistan played a clever game ahead of the Sharm-el-Sheikh meetings to partially meet the Indian demand. The Islamabad argument was that since the Mumbai attacks, there has been no major terror strike against India despite unconfirmed and speculative Indian intelligence reports of LeT planning more attacks Indian cities. Secondly, ahead of the Dr. Singh-Gilani meeting, Pakistan took some steps which put India on the defensive. The ISI chief, Shuja Pasha, met three Indian Defence Attaches posted in Islamabad to share with them what Pakistan was doing to respond to New Delhi’s request to stop India-centrist terrorism on its soil. Separately, Interior Minister Rehman Malik, met the Indian Charge d’Affaires, Manpreet Vohra, in Islamabad and handed him a Pakistani dossier on the Mumbai attacks for perusal by New Delhi on the basis of which those already arrested will be tried. Pakistan also filed charges against five persons accused of the Mumbai terror attacks including Zarar Shah, and a few other absconders. It also sought to improve the atmospherics vitiated by the withdrawal of appeal by the Pakistan Punjab Government for the re-arrest of the JuD chief, Hafiz Saeed, the main mastermind behind the Mumbai attack and founder of the ashkar-e-Toiba, who was earlier released by the Lahore High Court for lack of evidence. After India expressed its anguish and disappointment over the withdrawal of the appeal, both the Punjab and the Federal Governments approached the Supreme Court for an adjournment to allow them to take a final decision.
Pakistan was hoping that these gestures coming ahead of Prime Minister Gilani’s meeting with Dr. Singh and US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s visit to India would definitely go in favour of its demand for the resumption of talks. The US is on record of having said repeatedly that the talks must not be linked to fighting terrorism adding that the Pakistani military action in Swat and South Waziristan showed that Islamabad was now more serious about fighting terrorism than in the past. However, this had no takers in New Delhi which was of the view that what Pakistan was doing on its north-western border with Afghanistan, was missing on its eastern border with India. Pakistan was actually using its assault against Taliban militants in Swat to force the US to use its good offices with India to ask it to withdraw its troops on the border with Kashmir and hold talks on the resolution of the Kashmir problem.
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Within the Manmohan Singh Government and the Indian military, and intelligence agencies, there were differences of as to whether New Delhi should indefinitely stick to its conditions for the resumption of talks. Those in favour of talks argued that what the militant forces in Pakistan want is that India and Pakistan must remain in a hostile mode. There should be no normalization of relations. Normal relations will mean Pakistani pressure on the terrorist outfits to stop their actions against India. This was seen during the Musharraf regime when in his enthusiasm to improve ties with India and resolve the Kashmir dispute on the basis of his four-point plan of disarmament and joint mechanism, he reached an agreement with India to stop firing on the border and made a written commitment in 2004 not to allow Pakistani territory to be used for attacks against India and banned many terrorist groups includig the LeT and closed down their training camps. It was, therefore, argued by this school of thought that New Delhi refusal to hold talks and its insistence on the two conditions would amount to playing into the hands of terrorist forces in Pakistan. Given the lack of control of the democratically-elected Government in Pakistan on all instruments of power, even if President Zardari and Gilani make a categorical promise meeting the Indian conditions, their implementation could not be guaranteed if these commitments clashed with the policies of the ISI and the military. It was a different story during the Musharraf regime because he was both the Head of State and the Chief of Army Staff under whom the ISI also operates. So, he could deliver what he promised. The Zardari-Gilani Government can promise but cannot deliver.
Analysts say that it is in the background of these hard facts and ground realities that Prime Minister singh, even in the face of strong criticism from some quarters at home especially the Opposition BJP, took the courageous step to delink the terror demand from the talks. Sources say Dr. Singh, after becoming Prime Minister for the second time, came to the conclusion that a positive approach on the talks would generate increased incentives for Pakistan to deliver on its commitments to fight anti-India terror as well as greater opportunities for India to press ahead with those areas of the bilateral process which generate mutual equity. So, they began a series of quiet official discussions to see if the minimum groundwork for a successful meeting in Sharm-el-Sheikh could be laid. The Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries met on July 14 and reported back to their principals. Convinced of Pakistan’s actions, Dr. Singh had no hesitation to say yes to the resumption of talks.
New Delhi should now leave Pakistan in no doubt that if the dialogue is to be expanded, it will be done in a phased manner calibrated by Islamabad’s holding up its end of the deal. If New Delhi is to take the peace talks forward again, it must have concrete gains to show for it in a domestic context. And, conversely, another attack could well send the entire process into a terminal tailspin. Islamabad must understand these compulsions, just as it must understand that a compartmentalised approach to combating terrorism is no longer viable.
