The Special Representatives of India and China had their 13th round of
discussions since the former Prime Ministers of the two countries agreed to resolve the boundary issue. Although, as a matter of policy, the nature of discussions and the issues taken up are not disclosed, the impression is that there was little progress.
The two Special Representatives are trying to bridge the gap on the interpretation of political parameters and guiding principles finalized during Chinese premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in 2005.
Most Chinese observers agree that Chinese posture towards India on the border issue is hardening. China is placing renewed stress on Arunachal Pradesh being a part of China; it recently opposed an Asian Development Bank loan for a water management project in this North Indian State.
The change in China's stance reflects the present political climate which is different from 2003, when negotiations for settling the boundary dispute began and India-China ties seemed to be improving. Now, there is an unmistakable feeling, particularly in India, that the relationship is on a downslide. This is despite the commitment of India and China to keep the India-China relationship on track, to maintain peace and tranquility on the border and resolve their border dispute in the spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation.
India is upset with China on many issues and not just for its recent attempt to block India getting a 2.9 billion dollar loan from the Asian Development Bank for Arunachal Pradesh. It opposed waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group for nuclear commerce. Its opposition to India's quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council is well known. China also opposed declaring the JeM chief, Maulana Azhar Masood as terrorist in the Security Council. Significantly, China's military help to India's neighbours as part of its policy of containment of India are seen in India as provocative.
China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean adds another dimension. The new relationship with the Burmese military junta, use of Pakistan's Gwadar port and soon a naval base in Chittagong, Bangladesh, a nuclear submarine base in Hainan Island, South China and a base in Sri Lanka, are all seen with suspicion by defense experts in India.
Some observers are of the view that China does not wish to see India emerge as a strong military and economic challenge to it in Asia. This view is historical and flows from the time the two countries became independent. The rivalry between the two countries post World War 2 to assume leadership of the non aligned movement is well documented. The India China war of 1962 was a manifestation of this - an attempt by China to cut India to size.
To be fair to China, it also fears the US using its military and naval strength to "contain" it.
Surprisingly, economic relations between the two countries are also strained and observers note a sense of competition here as well. The indicators of stress are the rising anti-dumping cases and the charges of a Chinese conspiracy to falsely implicate Indian companies in a fake drugs scam.
To make matters worse, the arguments emanating from a Chinese think tank about strategies to dismember India into smaller States with the help of India's unfriendly neighbours have made policy makers sit up and take notice of the widening "trust deficit".
Relations between the two countries have their positives as well. India and China have engaged each other in many areas, adhere broadly to the rhetoric of friendship and have a shared of interest in not allowing tensions to overwhelm the relationship as a whole. They are cooperating to mutual advantage in multilateral forums such as the G-8, the G-20, BRIC and the trilateral dialogue with Russia. This process needs to be taken forward to create the requisite degree of mutuality of interest and trust.
