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Bush’s proliferation security initiative and India

	March 15, 2004

J.N. Dixit, former Foreign Secretary and Chairman Editorial Board



The covert horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons material and technology by scientists of Pakistan has been a matter of concern and debate in the international community, both at the Government and non-governmental levels. Details of this clandestine activity orchestrated by Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan are coming incrementally to public knowledge. Certain characteristics of this dangerous development need to be discerned and defined.

First and foremost, a number of countries made the acquisition of nuclear weapons an integral part of their strategic and defence planning.

Second, Pakistan, China and North Korea for political, strategic and economic motives functioned as catalysts for systematic horizontal proliferation of technology and material related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Third, Dr. Khan functioned as the key macro-level manager of this negative activity.

Fourth, whatever the obfuscations, successive governments of Pakistan since Zia-ul Haq’s time were either active participants in the horizontal proliferation or connived at this activity.

Fifth, the campaign against the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq resulted in the US and major Western powers tolerating Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation and its acquisition of nuclear and missile technology and nuclear material.

Sixth, companies in Western Europe, North America, Canada and South-East Asia contributed to Pakistan’s illegal sale of nuclear technology and nuclear material. It is inconceivable that the highly competent intelligence agencies of the Western democracies did not have any inkling of this ongoing skulduggery.

Seventh, the irrelevance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in terms of its stipulations or its capacity to enforce them stands affirmed, given the fact that North Korea, Iran and Libya are signatories of the NPT. But they still carried on the acquisition of WMD material illegally.

Eight, this successful illegal transaction of horizontal proliferation by Pakistan and other countries clearly brings out either the inefficiency or negative political influences affecting safeguards and inspection procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). That the Agency which has been perfecting its safeguards arrangements since the late 1960s, still needs to draft and implement an additional protocol for safeguarding nuclear facilities emphasizes its shortcomings.

New Delhi’s reaction to this critical development has been very measured and restrained. The Government of India has declared that this has been very dangerous and pernicious development. New Delhi has also clarified that it does not consider this phenomenon of horizontal proliferation a bilateral India-Pakistan issue. India correctly assesses that it is an issue affecting regional security and that it has international implications in terms of nuclear security and safeguards.

It is clear that the major nuclear powers of the world under the leadership of the United States would not only be taking remedial action against the phenomenon of horizontal proliferation engineered by Pakistan, but they would also be putting in place measures and regimes to prevent such proliferation in future. Some of these measures are bound to affect India’s nuclear programmes for peaceful purposes and as well as its nuclear weapons status in terms of future developments. Some indication of what these measures and remedial safeguards would be were described by President Bush in a speech at the National Defence University in Washington on February 11 last. The first portion of his speech was a detailed description of the activities of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and its associates. In the second portion of his speech the US President outlined seven corrective proposals.

First, Bush suggested that proliferation security initiatives which he announced a few months ago should be expanded to cover covert transactions, including shipments and transfers of nuclear material and technologies. He also suggested that the expanded proliferation security initiative should be implemented with structured and greater cooperation between the intelligence agencies, military services and law enforcement agencies, including the INTERPOL, to cover illegal non-governmental proliferators.

Second, he suggested a strengthening of the international legal system and international controls governing proliferation.

He recommended a UN Security Council Resolution, which would stipulate that all member-States of the United Nations should modify and expand their domestic laws to criminalise proliferation activity, to provide structured export controls and to ensure foolproof security of all sensitive materials and technologies within their respective borders.

Third, he proposed international arrangements to safeguard weapons and technologies left over from the Cold War from falling into the hands of non-government actors or into the hands of governments which are not entitled to have such materials within the framework of the NPT and related arrangements. He was referring to materials control over which became uncertain after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Fourth, he indicated that the US would increase its allocation of dollars 20 billion over ten years to support such programme which would focus on giving safe employment to scientists and technicians specialized in weapons of mass destruction in Eastern Europe and countries like Iraq and Libya. The US would help countries to end the use of weapons grade Uranium in their research reactors. The fund would also be used to assist countries to secure and eliminate not only nuclear, but also chemical and biological weapons.

Fifth, President Bush also indicated that US policy would be to structure meaningful international cooperation to implement the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. He desired this cooperation to focus on nuclear weapons States adopting operational policies to help non-nuclear States to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy. He said they should categorically renounce the pursuit of nuclear weapons. For this purpose the international community should create a fully safeguarded supply system for the installation and operation of nuclear plants for peaceful purposes.

The world’s leading nuclear experts with such States have dependable access to nuclear fuel for civil purposes at reasonable cost, subject to the condition that they must not undertake any enrichment and reprocessing of Uranium.

Bush suggested that the 40-member Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technology to any State that does not already possess full scale functioning equipment and reprocessing plants. (Since India already possesses such equipment and has independent technological capacities in this regard, this suggestion may not pose any threat to its interests. Nevertheless, the Suppliers Group would continue to be restrictive about nuclear supplies to India).

An important recommendation that Bush made is that the IAEA should be equipped to give the mandate to cover banned nuclear activity around the world and report these violations to the United Nations Security Council. This will impose the Council’s political and security jurisdiction on violators of non-proliferation stipulation.

Bush also suggested that an additional protocol should be provided and implemented by the IAEA requiring all States to declare details of their nuclear activities and facilities and the IAEA to inspect these facilities and apply full-scope safeguards. Bush’s recommendation is that only such countries as sign this protocol should be allowed to import equipment for their nuclear programmes.

The sixth remedial measure is the recommendation to create a special committee of the Board of Governors of the IAEA with focussed responsibilities to implement safeguard and verification procedures. This committee should be made up of governments in good standing with the IAEA.

The seventh recommendation is that countries which have been in violation of the nuclear proliferation obligations, accepted by the international community, should not be allowed to become members of the Board of Governors of the IAEA.

While assessing the possible impact of these measures which are quite likely to become part of international law and international regimes on nuclear issues, one must note the fact that India does not fall under the category of signatories of the NPT, nor has it acquired its nuclear and missile capacities clandestinely. India is alos unique in that its nuclear and missile capacities are essentially indigenous. An additional fact is that India has an impeccable record of preventing horizontal proliferation to other countries.

Despite these facts the impending prospects are of India remaining under pressure on its nuclear weapons status. As far as the US and its nuclear weapons allies remain categorical in their commitment to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its derivative international regimes, the fundamental objective of America would be to persuade India to cap its nuclear and missile weapons capacities and then to roll back and eliminate these capacities. As India has not violated any international treaty or agreements, this objective would be pursued through a process of insistent negotiations. New Delhi would certainly be pressurized to sign the proposed additional protocol which would involve India to make public practically all its nuclear activities and facilities and to allow international inspections. This is one of the proposals of Bush. Another proposal would equally impact India as it suggests that only countries which sign this additional protocol would be allowed to import nuclear equipment, technology and material.

So it would not be enough if India wishes to import nuclear material and equipment for peaceful purposes under international safeguards with the IAEA. It would become mandatory for India to abide by the provisions of the additional protocol with intrusive and expanded jurisdiction. It is obvious that New Delhi cannot blindly accept this additional protocol and make public those nuclear and technological facilities which are involved in India’s nuclear weapons and missile programmes. Even countries like the Russian Federation which have been providing equipment and material for India’s peaceful nuclear facilities for the generation of power would be under pressure to pull back from this cooperation.

The prospects for India are to move towards complete self-reliance regarding its nuclear and missile military technologies instead of depending on external inputs. The management of India’s nuclear weapons and missile status is going to be a major challenge in its foreign and national security policies. Two requirements are : to continue a constructive process of negotiations with the US and other nuclear weapons powers to safeguard our interests in this regard and secondly, to improve and tighten our technology management and export control laws to fall in line with the requirement of preventing horizontal proliferation of such capacities to others.