|
Bush’s new Iraq strategy : Sunni-Shia divide |
 |
Harjit Singh
It is still too early to pass a judgement on the advisability of President Bush’s new strategy on Iraq, a key part of which is to induct 21500 more troops into the country in the name of improving security. With the Iraq Study Group demanding phased reduction of troops and the Democrats, now controlling both Houses of Congress and vowing to deny funds for any further induction of US forces into the embattled Iraq, it will not be easy for President Bush in the last two years of his Presidency to take the majority with him in this gamble.
Much will, however, depend on the ability of the Al-Maliki Government to reduce the conflict between the Shias and the Sunnis which is now likely to increase rather than narrow down after the execution of Saddam Hussein and two of his henchmen. As it is, the pro-Saddam Sunni Baathists and the Shia militias owing allegiance to Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army are responsible for most of the attacks. The Sunnis attack Shias and it evokes retaliation. The Sunnis do not relish the fact of the Shias enjoying political clout as Prime Minister Al-Maliki is said to enjoy his present political position through the backing of t Muqtada al-Sadr. That the Shia-led Maliki Government rushed to execute Saddam Hussain and turned the occasion into a sectarian lynching when slogans in favour of Muqtada Sadr were raised just as the noose was being tightened around Saddam’s neck, speaks of the influence of the Shia commanders and their political leaders on the Government. No wonder, while announcing his new Iraq strategy, President Bush has put Al-Maliki on notice telling him not to expect open-ended support if he did not deliver on his part of the promise and not to expect the Americans to carry out his policing work.
But, President Bush’s efforts to hand over more power to Iraq’s security forces is undermined by their increasingly sectarian loyalties. Large sections of the army as well as the police are controlled by commanders with partisan agendas. Adding more troops would only compound the original mistake as the Sunnis would view it as adding to the muscle power of the Shias. The country’s 15 Arab provinces are already engaged in a deep struggle for power between fundamentalist Shias and disempowered Sunnis with Baghdad as the central prize. Already, the mishandling of Iraq by the Bush Administration, both intentionally and otherwise, has driven the Shia and Sunni communities apart. Every action like holding of elections, firing Baathists from the bureaucracy and building an Iraqi military and police force – has had seismic sectarian consequences.
Therefore, any part of Bush’s new strategy must not look like having any anti-Sunni streak. President Bush sought to undo the damage when he criticized the Al-Maliki Government’s eagerness to execute Saddam Hussein and said it looked like revenge killing. It may win him some Sunni supporters, but just one such gesture is unlikely to change the Sunni opinion against Bush. Al-Maliki needs to be told that that he must act as the Prime Minister of a country where the Sunnis and Shias have to co-exist and work towards narrowing the sectarian divide between the two communities. He must shed the impression that he was dependent for his political position on the support of such Shia leaders as Muqtada Sadr. It is natural for the Sunnis, who ruled the country during Saddam Hussein’s regime in spite of their being in a minority, to be angry over loss of power, position and influence in the new dispensation. But, their loss of power must not be projected as the gain of power by the Shias. Only then can the Shias and Sunnis reconcile their differences, give up hostilities and live like brothers. Bringing them together will be the biggest achievement of President Bush’s new strategy on Iraq rather than induction of more troops which will mean more causalities on both sides – American troops and innocent Iraqis.
|
