|
An assessment : Obsession with Kashmir : compulsions of Musharraf |
 |
What does the future hold? Says political analyst, Amitabh Mattoo, there are three scenarios which can be usefully described as “the optimistic scenario”, “the pessimistic scenario” and “the worst case “”: In the optimistic view, Agra may be seen as the beginning of a process that will eventually create the conditions for peace and stability in the region. If indeed there has been a meeting of minds of Vajpayee and Musharraf at Agra, then the future may still hold the promise of normalization. Assuming that both leaders survive politically, Vajpayee and Musharraf would meet on the fringes of the UN General Assembly in September, in Islamabad before the end of the year, and hopefully, soon enough for a summit of the SAARC countries in Kathmandu. And indeed, if the differences over the declaration were as few as the establishment in both sides seem to indicate, a joint statement could be worked out at these meetings.
But, a more likely scenario is that there will be a cooling off after Agra, and as the two sides seek to mould the events during those two days in the city of the Taj to suit their interests, the divide will widen. Under these circumstances, any process of engagement will have to begin afresh, and Agra will probably be quickly forgotten or remembered only for being the first summit in south Asia under the full glare of the media.
Assessing the outcome of the Agra summit, political observers say, the absence of even a joint declaration at the end of the summit proves conclusively that the domestic compulsions or the international pressure was not such that Pakistan or India would be ready to compromise on their well known positions. For some weeks now, a myth was constructed that the internal problems in Pakistan were so intense that Islamabad had no choice but to normalize relations with India. This, of course, was a totally wrong assumption. Similarly, there was a widespread belief that the pressure on Pakistan through international financial institutions was so great and the pressure on both New Delhi and Islamabad from the US as so much that they would both agree on, at least a few confindence-building measures, especially on the nuclear myth. The myth of the omnipotence of Washington has also been demolished.
According to a political analyst, Achin Vanaik, the summit highlighted three fundamental sticking points. These were: the centrality of the Kashmir issue to bilateral relations, reference to the involvement/aspirations of the Kashmiri people and the issue of cross-border terrorism. The fact that all the three problem areas are related to Kashmir is testimony enough to the centrality of the Kashmir issue. It is the core issue bedevilling India-Pakistan relations and must be recognized as such. In so far as nuclearisation makes Kashmir a potential flashpoint for a nuclear exchange, which it does, it is absurd to pretend that this is not so.
None but only the naive could think that President Musharraf would talk of anything else but Kashmir during his three-day stay in India. He certainly met that expectation in doggedly sticking to his so-called “unstructured” single-point agenda even as the Indian side, Prime Minister Vajpayee downwards, painstakingly tried to divert the General’s attention to subjects less sticky. Having assumed a political office alongside his military responsibilities, Gen Musharraf marched to India and much to the delight of his domestic constituency, parroted the “K” word right through the summit. In all this, India came out looking helpless against the verbal onslaught of a man with unnerving determination: a man who dares to roar not only from across the border but has the nerve to do so on Indian soil as well.
Former Foreign Minister, J.N. Dixit recounts the pronouncements and orientations of President Musharraf and the Pakistani Government, particularly after he received the invitation of the Indian Prime Minister on May 24. His lengthy interview to M.J. Akbar, published in the Asian Age and an equally lengthy interview given to Dileep Padgaonkar, editor of the times of India just a week before he came to Delhi clearly underlined the following points. His primary and over-arching objective to have a meeting with Vajpayee was to discuss the Kashmir issue from his point of view. He clarified that while he was willing to discuss other issues affecting Indo-Pak relations, he will be willing to discuss those other issues in a substantive and meaningful manner only after a solution satisfactory to him is achieved on Kashmir. In an interview to Gulf News just 48 hours before his arrival in Delhi, Musharraf stated that neither the Simla agreement nor the Lahore declaration and accompanying documents have any relevance to the summit at Agra. And when there was strong reaction in the press and political circles in India, he denied having made these remarks. Making some more points on Kashmir, he laid claim to Jammu and Ladakh as well saying the Muslims lived there as well. And he rejected the suggestion to turn the Line of Control into an international border.
Mr. Dixit says, these signals should have been sufficient for India to realize that he was coming for the summit with a narrow agenda and a single aim, i.e. either to proclaim to the world after the summit that India had accepted the Jammu and Kashmir issue as not just a very important item of discussion but the only and the most important item of discussion. And if he did not succeed, to proclaim to the world that despite the special effort that he had made to come to India, India remained obstinate and unreasonable.
As the Agra talks showed, India would be prepared to take up kashmir as the primary issue to be resolved provided cross-border terrorism is also discussed simultaneously. Gen. Musharraf did not deny that cross-border terrorism existed but defended it in the editors’ meeting by comparing it with India’s support to the Mukti Bahini in 1971. Says defence analyst, K. Subrahmanyam, he forgot that there were ten million refugees pushed into India which is not the case in Kashmir. Pakistan, which by adopting military rule, does not permit its citizens their basic democratic rights, tries to project its unconvincing concern for the aspirations of the people of Kashmir. This dual approach originates from the Pakistan fixation on the two-nation theory which has now come to be known as the “clash of civilizations thesis.” India cannot accept Pakistan’s professed concern for Kashmiri aspirations any more than Islamabad would be willing to accept India’s concerns about many Pakistani citizens, especially the Mohajirs, being deprived of their democratic rights.
To Gen. Musharraf, solving the Kashmir issue constitutes confidence-building in itself. The General insists that Kashmir is the core issue. Such core issues, says K. Subrahmanyam, do not get solved in one stroke. That too is accepted by the General when he talks about a step-by-step approach. But, he does not appear to be clear kin his mind that confidence-building is intended to promote an atmosphere conducive to progress from one step to the next. Surely after this trip to Delhi and Agra, he must have developed some understanding that his hours with Mr. Vajpyee and development of a rapport was a confidence-building measure in persuading India to accept that Kashmir is the core issue.
Some political observers attribute his extremely harsh stand on Kashmir to the influence of Jehadi outfits on him. Observers refer to his statement during his much-hyped breakfast meeting with Indian editors, when he said he would have to seriously consider buying back the Neharwali Haveli if he were to drop the issue of Kashmir. Says columnist Wilson John, no other statement from him could have betrayed his loyalty and allegiance to terrorist groups more than this. Wilson John says if Gen. Musharraf had any intention of making the summit a success, he should have asked, what he called Mujahideens or freedom fighters, to stop killing innocent people in the Valley. Instead, what he chose to do was call the leaders of various terrorist Jihadi groups for a meeting, seek their blessings and tell them about his agenda before flying to New Delhi. Only a tin pot dictator would have done this. No head of State of a civilized nation would seek blessings from terrorist organizations before setting out to make peace. Musharraf does not want the proxy war machine shut down. It keeps India tied down. It keeps Kashmir alive as an issue. And it does not impinge on his economic plans. Or so he continues to think after returning to Islamabad.
Musharraf is not anti-India because of religion or partition. For him, it is about geopolitics. He told officers in 1999 that even if the Kashmir dispute is resolved “our problems with India may not end because India wants to keep Pakistan weak. Pakistan is a thorn in India’s side constantly thwarting India’s ambition to become a world power”. Says political observer, Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “a way to be a sharp thorn is to keep India off balance with acts like Kargil or Kandahar”. And if his visit to India has served one purpose, it has demonstrated that the gloves are off and the real reason for the intransigence is exposed.
|
