|
Agreement to defang North Korea – Questions over Pyongyang’s sincerity |
 |
Harjit Singh
The three-year-long effort to defang North Korea of its nuclear weapon programme is ultimately on the way to achieving success. At the latest round of six-nation talks held in Beijing the US, China, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea finally reached an agreement that would close down all of Pyongyang’s nuclear facilities in exchange for security guarantees and financial and energy aid. Only four months ago North Korea had tested a nuclear bomb to demonstrate its capability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. North Korea has agreed to “shut down and seal” its Yongbyon nuclear facility within 60 days and allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors into the country for necessary verification. North Korea will provide complete details of its nuclear programme, including an inventory of its plutonium stockpile. By way of compensation, North Korea will get 50,000 tonnes of oil and its equivalent in economic and humanitarian aid from the countries involved in the negotiations.
The North Korean decision to renounce the nuclear path is bound to evoke appreciation from all over the world, particularly from the people of Northeast Asia. The North Korean crisis had led to tension and an atmosphere of uncertainty in the region. It is a major achievement for the Bush Administration. Bush’s compulsions are clear – the setbacks suffered by his Republican Party in the November elections in the US, the quagmire in Iraq and the continuing tensions with Iran. Similarly, North Korean leader Kim’s difficulties were no less compelling. The already energy-short nation was almost felled by an embargo aimed not only at Kim’s lifestyle, but also North Korea’s relations with its long-time benefactor, China.
However, given Pyongyang’s past behaviour, it is too early to declare that its nuclear problem has become part of history.
The Communist regime in Pyongyang is not known for keeping its word. It has sidestepped previous agreements and is thought to have many mountainside tunnels where it can hide its nuclear projects. It also remains to be seen whether external inspectors will be allowed free access to North Korean nuclear facilities. In the past, Pyongyang has gleefully kicked out IAEA inspectors and thumbed its nose at critics who dared question its belligerent policy of not only developing a nuclear arsenal but also brazenly indulging in proliferation.
The North Korean example could well mean that America and Iran can quietly work out a pre-negotiated arrangement that would get Teheran to freeze its enrichment activities to the present innocuous level, even while negotiations for the normalization of Iran-US relations take place.
|
